WeeklyWorker

05.12.2002

Understanding US hypocrisy

Ziauddin Sardar, Merryl Wyn Davies, 'Why do people hate America?', Icon Books, 2002, pp238, £7.99

It is vitally important for communists and revolutionary socialists to be aware of the multiple props that help sustain the military, economic, political, and cultural hegemony of the world's prime bulwark against any kind of progressive political advance. Sardar and Davies are therefore to be congratulated for advancing a very readable argument that critically examines the impact of United States power, as well as its disastrous effects on domestic American politics. Starting from the aftermath of September 11, the authors note how a sense of bewilderment and anger swept the country. A popular sentiment that repeatedly posed the question: why us? According to the US media and the pronouncements of the Bush junta, it was because 'they' hated the freedoms and values of American democracy. The book reviews a number of arguments from the rightwing punditocracy that attempt to explain September 11 in terms of an inevitable clash between the alien values of western christian and middle-eastern islamic civilisation. Sardar and Davies make it plain that these so-called arguments are self-serving claptrap designed to prevent a serious consideration of why the USA provokes such hatred. The greatest part of the book examines how America dominates the contemporary world order. The authors advance the argument that the US has evolved to a point beyond imperialism - to the situation where it is the world's sole hyperpower. This position is sustained by the ability to instantly transfer capital and cultural commodities across the globe, buttressed by US control of supra-national economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organisation and World Bank. As a result, the free trade agenda beloved of neoliberal and 'third way' ideologues in reality means unrestricted access for US capital in the developing world. This usually entails economic devastation whereby cheap commodities are dumped on the markets below production cost with the result of driving many indigenous businesses to the wall. But what is particularly galling is that, for all the demagogy, this 'free trade' is only one-way. Access to the US market is barred by a system of tariffs, as the relatively recent furore over steel imports shows. This is but one example of the many double standards that fuel anti-American feeling across the globe. Perhaps the most worrying aspect of the book is the evidence presented for an American world view that cannot see beyond its own borders. Central to this is the idea of "knowledgeable ignorance" - the 'knowing' of ideas and peoples as something they are not. Sardar and Davies give as examples The West Wing and the movie Rules of engagement, which make out that islam is an intrinsically intolerant and authoritarian religion. The passage of "knowledgeable ignorance" into popular culture is facilitated by an almost complete lack of foreign programming on the TV schedules. It is noted that the networks purchase programme concepts from overseas but are almost without exception remade to reflect the 'American experience'. This has the result of creating a populist common sense marked by jingoism, nationalism and an appalling lack of appreciation for the views of non-Americans. There are, however, two main problems with Why do people hate America? The first is methodological. Sardar and Davies employ Edward Said's seminal Orientalism: western conceptions of the Orient (1978) to get to grips with the genesis of American values, whose roots are to be located in the discourses of a medieval Europe that defined itself against the real and imagined threat posed by islamic civilisation. These superior and messianic creeds were brought to North America by the pilgrims and subsequently provided the rationale behind the ensuing war against the native population. The medieval values modified by subsequent experience were inscribed into the founding myth of a US manifest destiny. While this argument has weight, Sardar and Davies fail to explore the rise of the US in terms of economic power and military might, implying that the pre-eminent position occupied by the US in these areas is an outgrowth of its values. The second problem is political and flows from this idealist framework. If the dominance of the US is to be explained by its values, then US power can be reined in by seeking to change them. Americans and non-Americans can overcome hatred and suspicion by seeking mutual understanding, acknowledging cultural complexity and difference, and a joint opposition to all kinds of terrorism. What does this mean politically? The authors do not elaborate, but we can assume that there is not much room for the role of class. One final point has to be made. Despite the liberalism of the authors, Why do people hate America? has the potential for being a useful resource for all active in the anti-war movement. But for communists and revolutionary socialists, we must avoid glossing over the UK's role in the current war drive in the rush to condemn the US. For us the main enemy remains at home. Phil Hamilton