20.12.2001

SA conference failings

The Revolutionary Democratic Group looks back at December 1

W as the Socialist Alliance conference a success or a failure? According to the official statement, the SA à¢â¬Åheld a highly successful national conferenceà¢â¬Â, adopting a new constitution which gave members à¢â¬Åhistorically unprecedented rightsà¢â¬Â. It was a à¢â¬Åhuge successà¢â¬Â (December 3).

Our assessment is quite different. Two major failures stand out. First, conference failed to make any progress towards a party. Second, conference failed to maintain the unity of the alliance. But this should not be blamed entirely on the delegates. It was also due to a failure of the SA leadership beforehand. The six principal organisations must take a large share of the blame for that.

Before the conference the Revolutionary Democratic Group set out, both in our submission to the SA and in the Weekly Worker, exactly what was necessary to move towards a new workersà¢â¬â¢ party. First, the SA conference must adopt the aim of becoming a party. Second, it must decide to publish a regular SA newspaper. Third, it must adopt a constitution based on the principles of democratic federalism as the means of maintaining unity. Finally, conference needed to recognise the importance of the experience of the Scottish Socialist Alliance and the success of its transformation into the Scottish Socialist Party.

The SA conference failed to adopt the aim of a party. It failed to establish a regular paper. It failed to adopt a democratic federal constitution. It failed to take decisions preventing or making difficult the predictable walkout by the Socialist Party. It failed to recognise the importance of the experience of the Scottish working class and the socialist movement north of the border.

The split with the Socialist Party was a setback. Perhaps the single greatest political asset of the alliance was its capacity to overcome some of the historic divisions on the left. Advanced workers were attracted by an organisation that seemed capable of putting divisions into context, and able to unite in successful electoral and campaigning activity. An active minority of working class militants looking for political organisation found hope in the unity of the alliance.

The split will profoundly weaken the attraction to the alliance. The Socialist Labour Party and Communist Party of Britain will say they predicted the alliance was unlikely to succeed and they were correct to steer clear. Many workers will be disappointed and feel the project is faltering. Worse still, active members of the alliance will now reconsider their position. Many already acquainted with the Socialist Workers Partyà¢â¬â¢s approach to front organisations will not wish to become SWP political lackeys.

The damage to the allianceà¢â¬â¢s most valuable political asset is not the sole responsibility of the SWP and the SP, though they do bear a major responsibility. The SWP stuck rigidly to its plan without concession or any real attempt to build a consensus. Their only concern was to obtain an overall majority, however slim. The SP in turn worked throughout the period before and after the election as a separate force, only loosely attached to the alliance.

Without a clear set of objectives, you can take any view of the conference you like. But we set out our criteria beforehand. On that basis we can identify the failures of the conference. On the other hand, if the SWP wanted to get rid of the SP, prevent any moves to a party, avoid producing a paper and concentrating power at the centre, then the conference was surely a à¢â¬Åhuge successà¢â¬Â.

All these decisions were the outcome of the struggle at the conference. Although the SWP had possibly a majority of the votes, it would be a mistake to see their victory simply in terms of numerical superiority. Unlike the Socialist Party, the SWP did not stand alone. It was able to construct a hegemonic bloc around the idea of a à¢â¬Ëdemocratic and effectiveà¢â¬â¢ SA. This contained three of the six à¢â¬Ëprincipal organisationsà¢â¬â¢. It attracted some of the leading independents.

The à¢â¬Ëdemocratic and effectiveà¢â¬â¢ bloc comprised the SWP, International Socialist Group, CPGB and various independents, most notably Mike Marqusee, John Nicholson, Declan Oà¢â¬â¢Neill and Nick Wrack. The key feature was that they voted for the SWP constitution, as either first or second preference. Estimates by Martin Thomas (Action for Solidarity December 14) indicate this bloc had approximately 280 SWP, 50 pro-SWP independents, 35 CPGB and 15 ISG.

The Weekly Worker promoted the slogan of a à¢â¬Ådemocratic and effectiveà¢â¬Â SA every week since September. This was taken up by Socialist Worker (December 8). It says: à¢â¬ÅThe new constitution gives the SA a far more effective national organisation.à¢â¬Â In a similar vein, Liz Davies, the newly elected SA executive member, was looking forward to continuing à¢â¬Åthe development of the SA as a democratic and effective organisationà¢â¬Â (SA official statement). Similarly Mike Marqusee claimed that the new constitution à¢â¬Åwill make people feel enfranchised and the SA will be a more effective, democratic organisationà¢â¬Â. (Socialist Worker December 8).

The second alignment was the à¢â¬Ëdemocratic federal unityà¢â¬â¢ bloc comprising the Alliance for Workersà¢â¬â¢ Liberty, Workers Power, the RDG and various independents, most notably Pete McLaren and Dave Church. This bloc supported a federal constitution with democratic, majority decision-making. A central concern was to maintain SA unity with a constitution that was democratic, but could keep everybody on board the project. This bloc was estimated to be about 60 AWL, 30 independents, 29 WP and 21 RDG.

The third position was a federal constitution based on consensus, with a right for a minority to veto decisions it did not agree with. This was proposed by the Socialist Party. Clause 1.4 includes à¢â¬Åprovision for a consensus vote to be taken when requiredà¢â¬Â. Here is the essential difference between democratic federalism, based on majority decisions, and consensus federalism, which gives a veto to any minority.

This overview does not show up the contradictions within each of the three blocs, which requires further analysis. But if each bloc had voted in a consistent way, we would have had the following result:

à¢â¬ËDemocratic and effectiveà¢â¬â¢ 387 59%
Democratic federal unity 147 22%
Consensus federalism 122 19%

What were the politics of the à¢â¬Ëdemocratic and effectiveà¢â¬â¢ (DE) bloc? With 280 votes the SWP gave the bloc its overall political character. It was overwhelmingly opposed to adopting the aim of a party or an SA paper. It was opposed to a democratic federal constitution. It was opposed to following the SSP model.

The DE bloc failed, whether by accident, negligence or design, to seek out a principled compromise with the Socialist Party. This was possible, but it was not sought. Consequently we believe the official regrets now emanating from the SA leadership are nothing but crocodile tears. Whilst some in the SP appeared ready to leave, the majority of the DE bloc were happy to say goodbye. The obvious conclusion is that the DE bloc was overwhelmingly anti-party and pro-split.

Of course the DE bloc was not homogenous. It contained its own contradictions. The correct position for the bloc was simply to cast a first preference for the SWP constitution. This is what both the SWP and ISG did. The CPGBà¢â¬â¢s position in this bloc was therefore contradictory. They voted CPGB first and SWP second. Their voting indicates a preference for their own position with a desire to back the centralising tendency of the SWP. When the CPGB promoted pro-party positions such as an SA paper, they clearly found themselves at odds with their DE allies.

What would have been the correct pro-unity and pro-party position for the à¢â¬Ëdemocratic federal unityà¢â¬â¢ (DFU) bloc? We have come to the conclusion it was the Pete McLaren constitution for first preference and the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) for second preference. The McLaren constitution would have avoided a split. Whilst it would hardly have taken us very far forward, it includes a national membership and democratic decision-making. It was based on a tidying up of the existing constitution. But, had this been combined with an SSP second preference, it would have been a strong signal that this bloc wanted unity and a move to a party relatively quickly. This would have produced 145 first preference for McLaren and 145 second preferences for the SSP. Quite clearly this is not what happened.

What was the actual voting of this bloc? First, Workers Power only voted for itself. The group wanted to show itself as a pure revolutionary sect. Obviously they would not want to ally themselves with anybody. Although Mark Hoskisson has said they could work in an SSP-type party as a fallback position, they failed to give the SSP their second preference vote. This was a prelude to Workers Power opposing an SA newspaper, thus taking a clear anti-party position.

Second, the RDG declared in the Weekly Worker that we intended to vote SSP first and Workers Power second. The SSP option represented the shortest route to a party. It was the only party option on offer. The Workers Power constitution was the best democratic federal constitution on offer and the one closest to our own views. At the 11th hour, the AWL began lobbying us to support McLaren as the best unity option. Although some of us were dubious about this, during the conference we switched by majority decision to give our second preference to McLaren.

Our own self-criticism is that we backed the correct à¢â¬Ëhorsesà¢â¬â¢ (SSP and McLaren) but in the wrong order. We were being slightly ultra-left. The SSP vote was the most extreme partyist position on offer. McLaren was the most extreme democratic unity position on offer. We put party before unity. In the concrete circumstances of the day it should have been the other way round. We were much more likely to split than move to a party. Splitting was the prime danger to the alliance.

Third, the AWL did not offer a constitution of their own. They argued, with some justification, that any of the draft constitutions could serve as a base to start from. The key question was what amendments would be passed. Even a more centralised constitution could have been amended into a federal one. The AWL made unity their prime concern and voted McLaren first and for the Socialist Party second. The AWL has some sympathy for the SSP model. But their desire for unity leads them to support a minority veto. We believe that was incorrect.

The majority of the DFU bloc were in favour of making concessions to secure the unity of the SA. It was a pro-unity bloc. Whether it can be called a pro-party bloc is more contentious. There were clearly 50 pro-party votes (WP 29 and RDG 21). The RDG also had 20 second-preference votes. Had we switched to second preferences, we should have had at least 41 votes in total. Had the AWL given its 60 second preferences to the SSP, then 70% of the DFU bloc would have voted for a party.

We should now consider some of the changes to the SA constitution. On balance we describe them, in Leninà¢â¬â¢s famous phrase, as à¢â¬Åone step forward and two steps backà¢â¬Â, a view not dissimilar to the AWLà¢â¬â¢s à¢â¬Åtwo steps back and one forwardà¢â¬Â (Action for Solidarity December 14)!

So what advances did conference make? First, there is the creation of a unified national membership. Integrating the local membership into a single national membership is an obvious and relatively simple way of doing this. But it is not without its problems. Local members joined a local organisation. It is not necessarily the case that they want to join a national organisation, especially one that has just split. So we have a job to do.

Second, the SA has adopted the principle of majority decision-making. This was already in operation in many parts of the alliance. We now have a more uniform system. The national organisation was already working on the basis of majority decisions. We decided our programme and constitution in this way.

However, set against this is the lack of funds. It will mean that the SA will rely on the grace and favour of full-time operatives of one or another organisation. Subs set at a maximum of à£2 per month with less than 2,000 members yield less than à£2,000 per month for the centre. This is nowhere near enough to pay for alliance activities, communications and staff.

Both constitutional reforms could have been achieved without the SWP constitution. They are both quite compatible with democratic federalism. So what did the SWP constitution actually achieve in addition to the above two points?

Until this conference the national organisation allowed all affiliated or supporting socialist organisations to be represented through the Liaison Committee. This was not merely to give these socialist organisations a voice in the national organisation, but to incorporate and involve them in the alliance. The new constitution does not simply replace the Liaison Committee with a national council, but excludes all affiliated or supporting socialist organisations.

The RDG is now excluded from the national organisation altogether. We no longer have an inclusive SA. We no longer have rights nor indeed obligations to the Socialist Alliance. Overall this creates an imbalance between local alliances and political organisations. Local alliances will now have to do what they are told and the political organisations can do what they like.

In reality a number of political organisations will have members on the executive committee. There are three members of the SWP, one each of the CPGB, AWL, ISG, WP and three members of the Green Socialist Network. Although comrade Marcus Larsen is elected by SA members, he will presumably attend the executive under the instructions of the CPGB Provisional Central Committee and vote in line with CPGB decisions.

We do not necessarily have a problem with that. It is after all a form of federalism. It is the hypocrisy that is difficult to take. Whilst the CPGB opposes the federalism which would allow every organisation to be represented within the national organisation, the SA now operates a system of covert federalism. Unofficial federalism makes representation a privilege of a few organisations and a gift in the hands of the major organisation. How do we know who the friends of the SWP are? Simple. They are the ones the SWP voted onto the SA executive!

The position of the RDG is therefore no different from the Socialist Party. Neither the SP nor the RDG are part of the SA. The SP decided to leave. We decided to stay. They are not recognised as part of the alliance and neither are we. So you donà¢â¬â¢t have to walk out to be excluded: you can stay sitting in your seats!

Finally there is the issue of transparency. The RDG put forward a set of proposals in our own name as an affiliated organisation. Such a position is no longer recognised in the SA constitution. Presumably any proposal from the SWP, RDG or CPGB will be ruled out of order. This breaches the principle of transparency. In future proposals will come forward in the name of comrades such as John Rees and Rob Hoveman. Those with à¢â¬Ëthe knowledgeà¢â¬â¢ will realise that these are code words for à¢â¬ËSWPà¢â¬â¢.

Let us end on a seasonal note. When you are gathered round your Christmas log fire in the land of fantasy centralism, ask your guests to play the game of à¢â¬ËLetà¢â¬â¢s pretend the SWP doesnà¢â¬â¢t existà¢â¬â¢. Best wishes to all Weekly Worker readers.