20.12.2001

Human freedom and the moral veil

In the second of three articles, Michael Malkin examines the spurious claims of ethical socialism and argues for a morality of class struggle

à¢â¬ÅThe moment anyone started talking about morality, he would roar with laughter,à¢â¬Â said Karl VorlàÂ¤nder of Marx.

Anecdotes such as this well known remark, combined with the quotation of comments on morality scattered through a handful of Karl Marxà¢â¬â¢s writings, helped create the impression for a long time that, to use a phrase from The communist manifesto, Marx regarded morality as so much à¢â¬Åbourgeois claptrapà¢â¬Â and that to be a Marxist and a revolutionary meant in some sense eschewing ethical questions altogether.

Of course, VorlàÂ¤nder had his own axe to grind. His avowed aim, which constituted the theme, for example, of his lecture Marx und Kant, delivered in Vienna in 1904, from which the above quotation is taken, was to fill the supposed moral vacuum in Marxism by creating a fusion of Marxian socialism and Kantian ethics. We shall look at this in more detail later.

But does such a vacuum really exist? Does Marxà¢â¬â¢s critique of bourgeois morality amount to a total condemnation and rejection of morality per se; or is he only putting it in its proper place, by explaining and demystifying its origin, nature and function?

I would argue that the critique of morality to be found in the writings of Marx and the classical Marxists was meant to serve two basic ends: first, to expose the ideological and class nature of moral concepts in terms of their historical and social development; in other words, that, à¢â¬ÅLaw, morality, religion are [to the proletarian] so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interestsà¢â¬Â (D McLellan [ed] Karl Marx: selected writings Oxford 1977, p230 - hereafter KMSW); secondly, to combat the strong and influential tendency of Proudhonist ethical socialism in the working class movement of the time - a tendency that then and now seeks to bring about the emancipation of humankind not by smashing the whole edifice of the capitalist system as a precondition for human liberation but by somehow or other introducing à¢â¬Ëjusticeà¢â¬â¢ and à¢â¬Ëfairnessà¢â¬â¢ into existing society.

Neither of these two basic positions in any sense precludes ipso facto the possibility, indeed the necessity, of a genuinely communist ethic, something that, for example, Lenin makes quite explicit, as we shall see in a later article.

As regards the first, as I said in part one of this series of articles, the ideological critique of morality amounts in essence to the following: first, that morality is a human creation expressing in an ideal form a set of social relations. But these social relations reflect and are, in the final analysis, determined by underlying material relations of property and power; secondly, that the moral values prevalent in a particular society at a particular time always reflect the concrete material conditions of human life, the way in which that society produces the means necessary for its subsistence and reproduction; thirdly, that all moral conceptions are subject to change and development, reflecting changes in the forces and relations of production; and that there are, therefore, so far as Marxists are concerned, no such thing as eternal and immutable moral verities; finally, that in societies divided by class conflict, morality reflects these divisions and primarily functions as a means of justifying and legitimising the status quo, thus securing the power of the ruling class and reinforcing its ideological claim to represent the best interests of society as a whole (see Weekly Worker December 13).

As regards the second, the point is that the property-owning bourgeoisie and the propertyless working class stand in total opposition to one another, as contending, hostile classes. Communist theoreticians must, therefore, guard against introducing ethical postulates and moral appeals into their analysis, and especially not into their programmatic demands. It is not the business of socialists and revolutionaries to give the bosses the chance to dull the edge of the class struggle by indulging what Marx and Engels in The German ideology sarcastically call the ruling classà¢â¬â¢s à¢â¬Åphilanthropic enthusiasmsà¢â¬Â: ie, the tactic of giving crumbs and sops to the oppressed class, or buying off sections within it, all in the name of morality or à¢â¬Ëfairnessà¢â¬â¢. Hence, à¢â¬ÅIt is à¢â¬Â¦ necessary to resist all phrases which obscure and dilute still further the realisation that communism is totally opposed to the existing world orderà¢â¬Â (K Marx and F Engels, à¢â¬ËThe German ideologyà¢â¬â¢ CW Vol 5, London 1976, p469).

The point is that genuine class fighters, unlike, for example, the eccentric young Hegelians and utopians against whom Marx and Engels were directing their polemic in The German ideology, not to mention the generations of reformists who have succeeded them, do not base their struggle on moral appeals: communists à¢â¬Ådo not preach morality at all, as Stirner does so extensively. They do not put to people the moral demand: love one another, do not be egoists, etc.; on the contrary, they are very well aware that egoism, just as much as selflessness, is in definite circumstances a necessary form of the self-assertion of individualsà¢â¬Â (ibid p247).

The à¢â¬Åegoismà¢â¬Â of the working class, and particularly of its most advanced elements organised under the leadership of the Communist Party, consists in this context of the recognition that only through the total overthrow of existing conditions, through the smashing of the capitalist system and its bourgeois state apparatus, can the class liberate itself, and with it the whole of humanity, from that oppression and alienation that prevent all of us from living as real human beings.

It was in this light that Marx criticised, in a letter to Sorge, the activities of those utopian socialists among the leadership of the German Social Democrats who à¢â¬Åwant to give socialism a à¢â¬Ësuperior, idealisticà¢â¬â¢ orientationà¢â¬Â, replacing its à¢â¬Åmaterialistic basisà¢â¬Â with à¢â¬Åmodern mythology with its goddesses of Justice, Liberty, Equality and Fraternityà¢â¬Â. As he points out, à¢â¬ÅIt is natural that utopian theories, which before the era of materialistic critical socialism contained the rudiments of the latter within itself, can now, coming belatedly, only be silly, stale and basically reactionary à¢â¬Â¦à¢â¬Â (K Marx and F Engels Selected correspondence Moscow 1975, p290f - hereafter MESC).

The clearest and probably most influential example of classical Marxismà¢â¬â¢s ideological à¢â¬Ëexposureà¢â¬â¢ of bourgeois morality comes from the pen of Engels. As in so much else, it fell to Engels in his great book, Anti-DàÂ¼hring, to place Marxà¢â¬â¢s and his own thinking on the subject into a coherent, closely argued historical context. He writes that, where questions of good and evil are concerned, à¢â¬Åthis opposition manifests itself exclusively in the domain of morals - that is, a domain belonging to the history of mankind - and it is precisely in this field that final and ultimate truths are most sparsely sown. The conceptions of good and evil have varied so much from nation to nation and from age to age that they have often been in direct contradiction to each other.

à¢â¬ÅWhat morality is preached to us today? There is first christian-feudal morality inherited from earlier religious times à¢â¬Â¦ modern bourgeois morality à¢â¬Â¦ and the proletarian morality of the future, so that in the most advanced European countries alone, the past, present and future provide these three groups of moral theories which are in force simultaneously and alongside each other. Which, then is the true one? Not one of them, in the sense of absolute finality; but certainly that morality contains the maximum elements promising permanence which, in the present, represents the overthrow of the present, represents the future, and that is proletarian moralityà¢â¬Â (F Engels Anti-DàÂ¼hring Moscow 1947, p116).

Note that a specifically à¢â¬Åproletarianà¢â¬Â - ie, socialist/communist morality - far from being precluded, is regarded as already existing and as constituting the morality of the future. Like all morality, it derives from the specific historical conditions in which humankind labours to provide itself with the means of production and reproduction: à¢â¬Åmen, consciously or unconsciously, derive their ethical ideas in the last resort from the practical relations on which their class position is based - from the economic relations in which they carry on production and exchange (ibid p117). Under capitalism these relations are characterised by exploitation, oppression and alienation.

This historical materialist reading of morality, fully in accord with Marxà¢â¬â¢s own naturalistic and humanistic materialism, means that all moral conceptions can only and must be understood in the light of objective historical and social circumstances. Hence, à¢â¬ÅWe therefore reject every attempt to impose on us any moral dogma whatsoever as an eternal, ultimate and for ever immutable ethical law on the pretext that the moral world has its permanent principles which stand above history and the differences between nations. We maintain on the contrary that all moral theories have been hitherto the product, in the last analysis, of the economic conditions of society obtaining at the time. And as society has hitherto moved in class antagonisms, morality has always been class morality; it has either justified the domination and the interests of the ruling class, or, ever since the oppressed class became powerful enough, it has represented its indignation against this domination, and the future interests of the oppressedà¢â¬Â (ibid p117).

The advent of a à¢â¬Åreally human moralityà¢â¬Â can only be envisaged under conditions in which the working class and humankind have fully liberated themselves from the alienation inseparable from the capitalist mode of production: à¢â¬ÅWe have not yet passed beyond class morality. A really human morality which stands above class antagonisms and above any recollection of them becomes possible only at a stage of society which has not only overcome class antagonisms but has even forgotten them in practical life (ibid p118).

That moral conceptions, like all others, are a historical and social product of a particular concrete set of conditions and circumstances should be clear even from the common sense point of view, let alone to Marxists. Thus, for example, Engels on the category of equality, at the conclusion of an excellent historical sketch on the subject: à¢â¬Åthe idea of equality, both in its bourgeois an its proletarian form, is à¢â¬Â¦ itself a historical product, the creation of which required definite historical conditions that in turn themselves presuppose a long previous history. It is therefore anything but an eternal truthà¢â¬Â (ibid p132).

It is equally interesting to read Engels on the subject of à¢â¬Ëjusticeà¢â¬â¢ as a moral principle. Take, for example, the preface he wrote to the first German edition of The poverty of philosophy, in which he echoes Marxà¢â¬â¢s Critique of the Gotha programme: à¢â¬ÅAccording to the laws of bourgeois economics, the greatest part of the product does not belong to the workers who have produced it. If we now say: that is unjust, that ought not to be so, then that has nothing immediately to do with economics. We are merely saying that this economic fact is in contradiction to our sense of morality. Marx, therefore, never based his communist demands upon this à¢â¬Â¦à¢â¬Â (à¢â¬ËPrefaceà¢â¬â¢ The poverty of philosophy revised edition, Moscow 1975, p18).

The background to this reiterated and emphatic rejection by both Marx and Engels of the idea of à¢â¬Ëjusticeà¢â¬â¢ as a basis for socialist demands was, of course, an attack on the pernicious, long-term effects of Proudhonism on the French socialist movement. In Capital and elsewhere, Marx had derided Proudhonà¢â¬â¢s glorification of justice àÂ©ternelle (see, for example, K Marx Capital Vol1,Moscow 1959, p84f).

The ideological, class nature of morality had already been pointed out in The German ideology: à¢â¬ÅMorality, religion, metaphysics and all the forms of consciousness corresponding to these no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their actual world, also their thinking and the products of their thinkingà¢â¬Â (K Marx and F Engels, à¢â¬ËThe German ideologyà¢â¬â¢ CW Vol 5, London 1976, pp36-7).

To say that morality has à¢â¬Åno historyà¢â¬Â is merely to emphasise that it does not and cannot exist as some kind of autonomous sphere of human knowledge or experience. Of course, morality has a history, but that history derives exclusively in the final analysis from the relations of production that have existed in the course of humankindà¢â¬â¢s economic and social development. It is not something given to us from above by god in the form of tablets of stone, but is a concrete product of particular circumstances. Thus, well into the feudal period, the moral admissibility of serfdom and outright slavery were defended by scholastic theologians like St Thomas Aquinas, arguing on the basis of the writings of St Paul and others. Even when, for a variety of sound economic and practical reasons, the notion that the majority of human beings were no more than chattels or objects that could be bought and sold at the whim of their masters had died out in the west, it persisted for centuries in the east and was seen by eastern orthodox Christian apologists as entirely compatible with their creed.

Given the self-evident class nature of moral concepts, it is hardly surprising that in conditions of revolutionary class struggle the question should become particularly acute. In the Marxist tradition it is perhaps Trotsky, albeit with his usual flourishes, who puts the matter most forcefully: à¢â¬ÅAs for us, we were never concerned with the Kantian-priestly and vegetarian-Quaker prattle about à¢â¬Ësacredness of human lifeà¢â¬â¢. We were revolutionaries in opposition, and have remained revolutionaries in power. To make the individual sacred we must destroy the social order that crucifies him. And this problem can only be solved by blood and ironà¢â¬Â (L Trotsky Terrorism and communism 1920, p82).

In the remarkable pamphlet, Their morals and ours, Trotsky describes morality as à¢â¬Åa function of the class struggleà¢â¬Â and a product of social development; there is nothing immutable about it; it serves social interestsà¢â¬Â. In fact, morality à¢â¬Åmore than any other form of ideology has a class characterà¢â¬Â (L Trotsky Marxist versus liberal views on morality New York 1969, p15). Hence, à¢â¬Ånorms obligatory on all become the less forceful, the sharper the character assumed by the class struggleà¢â¬Â; and, finally, à¢â¬Åthe highest form of class struggle is civil war which explodes into mid-air all moral ties between the hostile classesà¢â¬Â (ibid).

The à¢â¬Åsacrednessà¢â¬Â of the individual and of each and every human life is one of those abstract and ultimately empty categories so beloved by bourgeois ideologues (in whose lying mouths it is mere cant) and by certain à¢â¬Ëethical socialistsà¢â¬â¢ in whose thinking it is a relic of crass liberalism. Marx tells us in the Grundrisse that, à¢â¬ÅMan is in the most literal sense a zoon politikon, not only a social animal, but an animal which can develop into an individual only in societyà¢â¬Â (my emphasis, à¢â¬ËGeneral Introductionà¢â¬â¢ KMSW p346). The free development of each is indeed conditional on the free development of all: ie, in the material, social context of a specific form of production and of the relations pertaining thereto.

Hence, Trotskyà¢â¬â¢s phrase about the à¢â¬Åcrucifixionà¢â¬Â of the individual under capitalism, alluding to the inability of individuals to develop anything remotely like their full potential as human beings, is most apt. As Marx puts it in The communist manifesto, the accusations levelled at communists by the bourgeoisie and by some ethical socialists are indeed correct: à¢â¬ÅThe abolition of bourgeois individuality, bourgeois independence, and bourgeois freedom is undoubtedly aimed atà¢â¬Â (KMSW p233) - with the emphasis on the epithet à¢â¬Åbourgeoisà¢â¬Â. Why? Because bourgeois individuality, bourgeois independence and bourgeois freedom have precious little to offer the working class, the vast majority of humankind, who must fight to achieve these values in their only meaningful form, as part of the struggle for the emancipation of humankind in general.

Here, in its sharpest form, we have the sort of language that exemplifies in some sense one pole of the contradiction referred to by Steven Lukes, who, as we have seen, argues that there is a striking paradox in the way that Marx and his followers approach morality: on the one hand, he says, they reject it as à¢â¬Åa form of ideology, and thus social in origin, illusory in content, and serving class interestsà¢â¬Â; they maintain that à¢â¬Åthere are no objective truths or eternal principles of morality,à¢â¬Â and that morality needs to be à¢â¬Åexplained, unmasked, and condemned as an anachronismà¢â¬Â. On the other hand (and here is the paradox), Marxà¢â¬â¢s writings à¢â¬Åabound in moral judgementsà¢â¬Â. Practically every text, however scientific or academic, contains à¢â¬Åcondemnation, exhortation, and the vision of a better worldà¢â¬Â (S Lukes Marxism and morality Oxford 1985, p3f).

I have already discussed what I think are the most serious shortcoming in Lukesà¢â¬â¢s approach (see Weekly Worker December 13), but his à¢â¬Ëresolutionà¢â¬â¢ of the paradox contains an important truth. We can and must distinguish between on the one hand à¢â¬Åthe morality of Rechtà¢â¬Â (by which he means the complex of rights, duties and principles that govern the relations and constitute the ethical framework of civil society under the capitalist mode of production); and on the other hand the à¢â¬Åmorality of emancipationà¢â¬Â.

The à¢â¬Åmorality of Rechtà¢â¬Â brings us naturally on to a discussion of the moral, value-laden issue of rights in Marxian and Marxist thinking. As Marx puts it in one of his seminal early essays, à¢â¬Åthe so-called rights of man [are] nothing but the rights of a member of civil society: ie, egoistic man, man separated from other men and the communityà¢â¬Â (à¢â¬ËOn the Jewish questionà¢â¬â¢ KMSW p52). The à¢â¬Åright of man to freedom is not based on the union of man with man, but on the separation of man from man. It is the right to this separation, the rights of the limited individual, withdrawn into himselfà¢â¬Â (ibid p53).

Hence, the practical outcome of this view of rights is that à¢â¬Åthe right of man to property is the right to enjoy his possessions arbitrarily, without regard for other men, independently from society, the right of selfishness à¢â¬Â¦ it leads man to see in other men not the realisation but the limitation of his own freedomà¢â¬Â (ibid).

Marxà¢â¬â¢s analysis of RechtsverhàÂ¤ltnisse (the relations of right) has a direct moral relevance. These relations constitute what Hegel (and Marx after him) called à¢â¬Ëcivil societyà¢â¬â¢, the realm of the bellum omnium contra omnes (war of all against all): the competitive, egoistic relations of bourgeois society, in which as individuals we pursue our own interests regarding and treating one another as no more than the means to the achievement of our own ends. This realm of private property rights, contractual obligations - all the paraphernalia so lauded by the apologists of free market capitalism - Hegel dubs that of à¢â¬Åsubjective freedomà¢â¬Â.

For Hegel, the state provides the sphere of à¢â¬Åobjective freedomà¢â¬Â, the necessary framework within which the otherwise chaotic and destructive forces of à¢â¬Ëcivil societyà¢â¬â¢ can be contained and controlled. The result is a synthesis of subjective and objective freedoms that is capable of constituting the rational (and hence moral) basis for human progress.

For Marx, however, the rights and related ethical principles governing Hegelà¢â¬â¢s vision of the state and civil society were alike rooted in the objective necessity of stabilising production relations, and thus class relations on behalf of the ruling class. In this sense, of course, Recht and everything that flows from it in the form of ethical and moral principles or norms serves an obvious ideological purpose.

Recht claims to embody such à¢â¬Ëobjectiveà¢â¬â¢ principles as à¢â¬Ëjusticeà¢â¬â¢; it claims to be able to define à¢â¬Ërightsà¢â¬â¢ and à¢â¬Ëobligationsà¢â¬â¢ that not only have a universal human validity but also serve the interests, not of a particular class, but of humanity in general. Here we do have an example of what Marx rightly called à¢â¬Åbourgeois claptrapà¢â¬Â. The claims made on behalf of Recht (unsurprisingly, by those who gain most from upholding it) are spurious. The real function of the ethical postulates founded on this notion of right is to consolidate, protect and extend the social/class relations of the existing order.

This Marxian insight, based on the materialist analysis of production relations, has a number of important consequences for socialists. It means, pretty obviously, that, however one might quibble with Lukesà¢â¬â¢s use of the term à¢â¬Åillusory in contentà¢â¬Â, bourgeois à¢â¬Ëmoralityà¢â¬â¢ has no rationally or morally compelling force. It arises in the sphere of ideas as a means of ensuring the survival of the status quo to the benefit of those who, in the context of the capitalist mode of production, enjoy, whether directly or indirectly, the wealth and power that accrue from the exploitation of surplus labour and the surplus value it generates. Secondly, where socialists and revolutionaries are concerned - leaving aside specific tactical questions relating to this or that particular struggle - it makes no sense whatever to criticise capitalism for failing to live up to its own (vacuous) à¢â¬Ëprinciplesà¢â¬â¢ or à¢â¬Ëmoralityà¢â¬â¢ in terms of à¢â¬Ëjusticeà¢â¬â¢ and à¢â¬Ëfairnessà¢â¬â¢. Finally, as Marx put it in Capital, à¢â¬ÅWhere two rights are equal, force decidesà¢â¬Â - and that force, under capitalism, is preponderantly in the hands of the capitalist class itself.

Obviously, Marx himself, in his political struggles, defended and fought for all manner of rights, just as we do and we must, but he saw them very critically as expressing the contradictions of bourgeois society, in which the rights that really matter concern not the liberty of human beings, but are related to the ownership and disposal of things. When liberals talk about the inalienable rights of human beings, they often forget that these à¢â¬Ërightsà¢â¬â¢ are not the abstract result of some god-given ordinance, but are the outcome of a protracted, historical and often bloody struggle. That which has been à¢â¬Ëgivenà¢â¬â¢ can just as easily be taken away, as we are finding at the moment with Mr Blunkett.

Marxà¢â¬â¢s searing criticism of Proudhon and his à¢â¬Ëjust exchangeà¢â¬â¢, justice àÂ©ternelle and so forth maintains that to argue for social à¢â¬Ëjusticeà¢â¬â¢ on the part of our rulers is not only futile, but dangerous. Why? Because it gives tacit acceptance to the notion that there really are some objectively based and universally applicable standards of morality that exist outside of and independent from the concrete material sphere of the relation between ruling and ruled classes; that under the conditions of bourgeois society there is some moral ideal of à¢â¬Ëjusticeà¢â¬â¢, for example, whose realisation could somehow pave the way for lasting social harmony, human happiness and fulfilment.

Those few of us - this writer included, sad to say - who thought at one time that Soviet à¢â¬Ësocialismà¢â¬â¢ was reformable and who for a while were seduced by Gorbachevà¢â¬â¢s perestroika were forced, however painfully, to part company with such illusions back in 1988, when the Communist Party of the Soviet Union espoused the doctrine of à¢â¬Åuniversal human valuesà¢â¬Â, thus jettisoning all pretence of upholding the notion of the class content of relations between states. à¢â¬ÅHumanà¢â¬Â? Not in the context of capitalism and the bourgeois state. Not now and not ever.

Similar arguments can be advanced in relation to the notion of à¢â¬Ëfreedomà¢â¬â¢, as promulgated by our bourgeois ideologues. Again, we as socialists and revolutionaries resolutely struggle for freedom and freedoms within the context of existing society. Only the most ultra-left philistines would simply dismiss the actual freedoms we enjoy in this country compared with comrades elsewhere.

Our own Communist University 2001 was a good example of this. There we were, advocating the revolutionary overthrow of the state, developing and deepening our theoretical knowledge as part of the tools we shall need for the task. There were no impediments to our revolutionary and, in the eyes of the bourgeoisie, à¢â¬Ëimmoralà¢â¬â¢ purpose: no policemen on the gate, taking our names; no photography or surveillance; no arrests on bogus charges, harassment and the like, leaving aside the physical, sometimes mortal, threats that comrades face in other societies.

Of course, to a great extent, this a reflection of the period of reaction in which we live, a period in which the ruling class is so convinced of its omnipotence that the activities of a relatively small number of revolutionaries can safely be dismissed as less than marginal.

But our à¢â¬Ëfreedomà¢â¬â¢ under capitalism, just like our spurious à¢â¬Ërightsà¢â¬â¢ are in the gift of the ruling class. That which has been given can just as easily be taken away, when and if the occasion merits such action. It would not surprise me to find that the measures aimed at à¢â¬Ëterroristsà¢â¬â¢ contained within Blunkettà¢â¬â¢s act are sooner or later wielded against working class revolutionaries.

Just as in the case of à¢â¬Ërightsà¢â¬â¢, Marxà¢â¬â¢s criticism of à¢â¬Ëfreedomà¢â¬â¢ in the context of bourgeois values is equally unambiguous. As usual, the best place to look is in his political economy. Here the paradigm is the relationship between the capitalist and the worker, à¢â¬Åwho sells the particular expenditure of forces to a capitalist, whom he confronts as an independent individual. It is clear that this is not his relation to the existence of capital as capital: ie, to the capitalist class. Nevertheless, in this way everything touching on the individual, real person leaves him with a wide field of choice, of arbitrary will and hence of formal freedomà¢â¬Â (K Marx Grundrisse London 1973, p464).

That this particular à¢â¬Ëfreedomà¢â¬â¢ - the so-called freedom of contract between capitalist and worker - is purely formal needs no explanation. In this country it is a choice between finding work and living in relative penury; in large areas of the world, the choice is between work and starvation. The workersà¢â¬â¢ absolute dependence on capital in terms of selling their labour-power in return for wages is self-evident, so this freedom is no more than a fictio juris.

But the same applies to many of the supposed freedoms that we all à¢â¬Ëenjoyà¢â¬â¢. Many of the freedoms purportedly available to the working class, the freedoms that we are told represent all that is best, all that is morally superior in à¢â¬Ëourà¢â¬â¢ way of life, are equally formal, equally illusory, because they cannot be exercised in the real world. They are not part of a moral order encompassing à¢â¬Ëuniversal human valuesà¢â¬â¢, but always have been and, under capitalism, always must remain an arena for constant struggle.

And even our victories, when they do occur - victories most of which are now a matter of history rather than lived experience for many of our comrades, victories by our class in winning an extension of à¢â¬Ërightsà¢â¬â¢ and à¢â¬Ëfreedomsà¢â¬â¢ under the existing system - should not fool us into thinking that they achieve anything more than an amelioration of the conditions of our continuing slavery and oppression. Only the smashing of the whole edifice of the capitalist system can really introduce a situation in which à¢â¬Ërightsà¢â¬â¢ and à¢â¬Ëfreedomsà¢â¬â¢ in the bourgeois sense become irrelevant and human rights and human freedoms become real - not just for some, but for all.

But on what moral basis do we as socialists and revolutionaries conduct our struggle for these real rights and freedoms, in the context of what our friend, Mr Lukes, calls - in contradistinction to the à¢â¬Åmorality of Rechtà¢â¬Â, the à¢â¬Åmorality of emancipationà¢â¬Â? Does the Marxian and Marxist theory of human emancipation indeed have any kind of specifically moral content at all? Karl VorlàÂ¤nder, with whom I began this article thought not. The predominance of a determinist, almost neo-Darwinian reading of Marxian socialism and revolutionary theory among the first generation of Marxist theorists, foremost among whom was Karl Kautsky, suggested that the victory of socialism was a matter of scientific à¢â¬Ëinevitabilityà¢â¬â¢. It must and would happen, so on what grounds could or should anyone argue that it ought to happen? VorlàÂ¤nder believed that the scientistic faith of Kautsky and his many disciples was naive and misplaced; that Marxism needed, as it were, an injection of moral principles to complement its materialist basis.

The experiences of the last century have taught us all some sober lessons about the meaning of à¢â¬Ëinevitabilityà¢â¬â¢. In the next article, I hope to show that in their different ways both Kautsky and VorlàÂ¤nder had failed to appreciate the intrinsically moral dimension of Marxà¢â¬â¢s vision of human emancipation.

Part I - Marx, Marxists and morality
Part III - A communist morality