WeeklyWorker

04.07.2001

Brink of collapse?

Houdini perhaps, but Lazarus? The next few weeks will show whether David Trimble can once again extricate himself from the consequences of his latest display of kamikaze politics, or whether his resignation as first minister of the Northern Ireland legislative assembly was indeed a threat too far. It is a foolish politician who issues a public ultimatum to the leaders of the Provisional Irish Republican Army.

The first thing to get clear is that Trimble's quitting the post has nothing remotely to do with principle. He has used the tactic before when under pressure from anti-agreement unionists in the Democratic Unionist Party and in his own Ulster Unionist Party - most recently in the winter of 1999, when his threat to resign was obviously intended to provoke a crisis. The then secretary of state, Peter Mandelson, duly obliged in the following February by temporarily suspending the executive and other institutions of devolved government, thus saving Trimble's political bacon, at least for the time being.

As we have stated, his surprise announcement on May 8 that he would leave his position on July 1 if the IRA had not begun decommissioning its weapons was merely a stunt, an electoral ploy aimed at staunching the haemorrhage of support from British-Irish protestants disillusioned by what they perceived as the one-sided nature of the peace process. It was a ploy that signally failed: both in the Westminster and in the local government elections on June 7 the UUP suffered serious losses and Trimble was humiliated (see Weekly Worker June 14).

The choice of July 1 had little to do with the theoretical deadline for decommissioning. Rather it marked one of the most solemn days in the Orange calendar - the anniversary of the day in 1916 when men of the overwhelmingly protestant 36th (Ulster) Division went over the top on the first day of the Battle of the Somme, thousands of them dying with the cry of 'No surrender' on their lips. It was the apogee of Ulster's closeness to Britain and the crown. What better backdrop for Trimble to confirm his departure than the memorial to this slaughter?

Flanked by the secretary of state, John Reid, and hundreds of Orangemen in full regalia, Trimble took the opportunity to insist that it was the recalcitrance of the IRA that had forced him to step down, and that he would be prepared to resume the office of first minister only when the IRA's weapons are put permanently beyond use. His backers in the British media, notably The Daily Telegraph, dutifully peddled the same line: Trimble had been "pushed" into "an unavoidable decision because of Sinn Féin/IRA's continuing refusal to decommission weapons ... democrats are forced to forfeit their place in government because of the obduracy of paramilitary-linked parties" (July 2).

The next six weeks will see intensive negotiations between the parties and the two prime ministers, but it seems unrealistic to expect any significant progress in such a short time. Under the provisions of the Good Friday accords, Trimble has appointed his old ally, Sir Reginald Empey, minister of enterprise, trade and investment in the power-sharing executive, as caretaker first minister. By August 12 the assembly must vote in a new first minister and deputy on the basis of a 50%-plus-one mandate from both unionist and nationalist members.

Given that the UUP has already stated its determination not to re-enter the executive prior to decommissioning, a successful ballot appears impossible, deadlock would follow and the institutions could therefore once again be suspended. This is clearly what Trimble is hoping for, and with evident relish: "I confidently predict the assembly and the institutions will be suspended. The British government has no other choice" (The Observer July 1).

This is not true. The government does in fact have an alternative, but one which it will be loathe to adopt: namely the calling of fresh elections to the assembly, elections that would very probably see the voters confirming the pattern of last month - deserting the UUP/SDLP centre ground and moving to the DUP/Sinn Féin extremes. Of the two possibilities, suspension is obviously the more likely. Its consequences would be unpredictable enough, but a new assembly in which Ian Paisley would be entitled to the post of first minister and Gerry Adams to that of deputy (an ironic, if by no means impossible, outcome) would throw the whole political process into chaos, as well as spelling Trimble's final demise as leader of the UUP.

In at least one respect Trimble has been successful, in so far as he has managed to place the question of arms decommissioning at the centre of the agenda. It is an issue surrounded by mythology and misrepresentation.

In the first place, as even The Sunday Telegraph grudgingly admits, "There is nothing in the [Good Friday] agreement which explicitly obliges the IRA to surrender its weapons" (July 2). In fact the agreement's stipulations are limited to committing its signatories to "use any influence they may have to achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms" (my emphasis). And of course it is Sinn Féin, not the IRA, which signed up to the deal.

It was in a private letter from Blair to Trimble, dated April 10 1998, that assurances were given inter alia to the effect that IRA 'disarmament' would have to precede Sinn Féin representation on the executive. Pledges to similar effect were used by Blair to bolster support for the agreement prior to the 1998 referendum. The fact that these undertakings were subsequently ignored by Downing Street, with Trimble's acceptance, is a matter for them.

Secondly, as even the heads of MI5 and MI6 would agree in private, the whole question of decommissioning is essentially a red herring. It has been loaded with political resonance and symbolism, but is militarily meaningless. Even if the Provos were to hand over every armalite, every bullet and every ounce of semtex - which we can be sure they will never do - they have the finances and the connections to obtain fresh arms with relative ease.

Thirdly, as general John de Chastelain's report makes clear, the IRA, despite its obvious lack of intention to disarm, has gone through the motions of cooperating with the International Commission on Decommissioning - allowing representatives access to some of its arms dumps - which is more than you can say for the loyalist paramilitaries. Senior IRA officers have had a number of meetings with the commission - the latest as recently as last week - and claim that putting their weapons "verifiably beyond use" is still on the table.

The negotiating stance is to demand that in return there must be implementation in full of measures relating to demilitarisation and policing. This would include "full reform" of the RUC in line with the Patten report, establishing, in the words of Gerry Adams, "an accountable, representative civic police service which is free from partisan political control", together with a "fair and impartial system of justice, effective safeguards for human rights and the right to freedom from sectarian harassment" (An Phoblacht June 28).

The Orange murder gangs of the Ulster Volunteer Force, Ulster Freedom Fighters and Ulster Defence Association remain armed to the teeth. They meaninglessly insist that the IRA must declare that 'the war is over' before they even contemplate disarmament themselves. Yet the unionists and bourgeois commentators concentrate their criticism on Sinn Féin/IRA, claiming that, since the political groups associated with the UVF, UFF and UDA are, unlike Sinn Féin, not represented in the devolved government, only IRA "intransigence" is to blame for the crisis deliberately engendered by Trimble's resignation.

The massed ranks of the leader-writers in our bourgeois press are assiduously promoting the impression that the IRA is now under unprecedented pressure to 'deliver' on the decommissioning question. They have been joined by the leaders of the SDLP and by certain representatives of Bertie Ahern's Fianna Fáil, whose approach is understandable in the face of their electoral setbacks last month: it is now Sinn Féin, not the Social Democratic and Labour Party, that can claim to represent the majority of nationalists in the North of Ireland and their mandate is evidently growing on both sides of the border; the Free State government was humiliated by the Irish people's rejection of the Nice Treaty, a rejection actively promoted by Sinn Féin. It is against this party political background that the decommissioning frenzy needs to be judged.

SDLP deputy leader Seamus Mallon has now called for the two governments to consider the expulsion of Sinn Féin from the executive. Its two ministers on the executive, Martin McGuinness and Bairbre de Brun, have already been barred by Trimble - in legal contravention of the provisions of the agreement - from participating in the north-south consultative bodies. Expelling Sinn Féin altogether from the executive might be feasible under the dubious provisions of Section 30 of the 1998 Northern Ireland Act, but it would be a move motivated entirely by the perceived need to strengthen the interests of the nationalist centre.

Besides, Blair knows full well that a permanent settlement cannot be achieved without Sinn Féin. He will even risk seeing it replace the SDLP as the main party of the republican/nationalist population, so long as the peace process is not jeopardised. Ejecting Sinn Féin would risk everything and cannot be contemplated.

So far as the south is concerned, Ahern knows well enough from opinion poll evidence that in the forthcoming general election Sinn Féin's one TD, Caoimhgà­n à“ Caoláin, is likely to be joined by maybe another dozen or so comrades in the Dáil, where they could conceivably hold the balance of power. The taoiseach would do well to treat the siren voices urging "pressure" on Sinn Féin with caution, as the existing mandate on both sides of the border indicates grassroots satisfaction with Sinn Féin's role in the peace process to date, including on the issue of weapons. If Trimble, backed by the British and Irish governments, thinks that he can 'pressurise' the IRA into making hasty, one-sided concessions, then he is making the same mistake as Brian Faulkner, Roy Mason, Margaret Thatcher and many others.

What of the IRA itself? It is now nearly seven years since it last conducted military operations. The silence of the guns speaks for itself and the IRA's statement of May 6 2000 - with its claimed commitment to put weapons beyond use under certain specific conditions - represented a huge concession. As an army that was never defeated by the forces of the crown, it would be entirely unrealistic - as all participants in the process know full well - for the IRA unilaterally to declare some form of 'surrender' - which is exactly how the decommissioning of weapons would be regarded by militant republicans.

When conceiving his stunt, Trimble must have known that it would come at a time when tension in the Six Counties is historically at its highest, with the onset of the marching season. Once again, Drumcree will be the focus of a possible conflagration. Once again the Parades Commission has banned the Orange Order from marching down the Garvaghy Road, only for the UVF to declare that it will ensure the march goes ahead whatever happens. Death threats have been issued by the UVF against local catholic-nationalist leaders. How many people remember how Trimble, now the 'moderate' Nobel peace laureate, but then a catholic-baiting hard-line Orangeman, marched arm in arm down the same road with Ian Paisley in 1995 in order to win the succession to leadership of the UUP from Jim Molyneux?

Whatever else it achieves, Trimble's resignation has already borne fruit in a renewed outbreak of rank sectarian violence. On June 23, John McCormick was shot dead by the UFF in his own home in front of his two young sons and on July 4 Kieron Cummings was gunned down by loyalist murderers as he waited for a lift to work. Both these young men died not because they were politically active republicans, let alone paramilitaries, but simply because they were catholics.

In the last analysis this 'neither war nor peace' situation stems from the Good Friday agreement, which ended 30 years of war but institutionalised the sectarian divide through its bureaucratic provisions. Such a constitutional settlement can never provide the basis for a democratic peace because it leaves intact a Northern Ireland statelet which imprisons within its carefully calculated borders a large and unwilling catholic-Irish minority. Nor on the other hand will a democratic peace be brought about through Sinn Féin's scheme to let demography - in the shape of a growing nationalist population in the Six Counties - take its course. In the meantime, however, SF will play the peace process and its institutions for all they are worth, banking on a steady increase in its own support both north and south of the border.

A democratic peace can only be achieved through a united Ireland based on the voluntary agreement of both national communities. That requires a united Ireland within which a British-Irish province would be guaranteed the right to self-determination. Only by championing this perspective, infused with an internationalist vision of socialism, can antagonisms be reduced and give way to trust and solidarity. And for that the organisation of a workers' vanguard party is itself a precondition l

Michael Malkin