05.07.2000

Stalin's terror and orthodox Trotskyism

Vadim Z Rogovin 1937: Stalin's year of terror Mehring Books 1998, £19.99

Vadim Rogovin was a distinguished Soviet academic, who became a Trotskyist after discussions with David North, the leader of the former American Workers League. It was Rogovin who theoretically inspired the Workers League, and the parties of the International Committee of the Fourth International, to rename themselves as Socialist Equality Parties. Rogovin's work is one part of a six-volume history of the Soviet Union between 1922-1940, and Mehring Books intend to publish the other works in English.

Rogovin describes in impressive detail the events, and the role of personalities, in relation to the major purge trials that took place between 1936 and 1937. As an orthodox Trotskyist, he upholds the view that the Soviet Union was a degenerated workers' state, but the horrific terror of the purge trials showed that the working class had no political power. Indeed, the trials could be seen as the culmination of a process that had resulted in the political and ideological domination and consolidation of the rule of a new class over the working class. Hence, Stalin's terror was aimed at destroying the remnants of old Bolshevism, and thereby ensuring that the CPSU became a reliable instrument of the rule of this new class.

Rogovin empirically describes this reactionary political process, but he does not answer the question that arises from his analysis: which class politically dominated the Soviet Union during and after the terror? Instead of arriving at conclusive political answers, Rogovin contends that the purge trials indicated the instability of the Stalinist bureaucracy, which still used the formal ideology of socialism in order to legitimise the terror. The political necessity of the terror was required in order to crush any potential for opposition, which could become threatening given the still fragile nature of the Stalinist regime:

"In contrast, during the 1930s, the traditions and ideals of the October revolution were still alive in the masses. These unextinguished traditions threatened the very existence of the bureaucracy, which feared the masses who had shown their true force and capacity during the years of the revolution and civil war. In a country where the lava of socialist revolution had not yet cooled, in order to reinforce the social, political and ideological relations created by Stalinism, which were still highly unstable, it was necessary to physically exterminate the communist opposition" (p143).

Significantly, the author's use of a quote by Trotsky calls into question Rogovin's willingness to still consider the Soviet Union as a type of workers' state because of its political instability. Trotsky shows that the 'bureaucratic socialism' of Stalinism represents different social interests in comparison to the interests of the Left Opposition and the working class. Implicitly, Trotsky seems to be suggesting that the purge trials represent the counterrevolutionary actions of a ruling elite that is becoming a distinct class, and has class interests that are diametrically opposed to those of the working class:

"When the Stalinists call us 'traitors' ... in this accusation one can detect not only hatred, but a peculiar sincerity. They feel that we have betrayed the interests of a sacred caste ... which alone is capable of 'building socialism', but which in fact is compromising the very idea of socialism. We, on our part, feel that the Stalinists are traitors to the interests of the Soviet popular masses and of the world proletariat. It would be absurd to explain such a ferocious struggle by referring to personal motives. We are dealing not only with different programmes, but also with different social interests which are coming into ever more hostile collision with each other" (p144).

However, Trotsky does not arrive at the conclusion that his analysis suggests: namely that the Soviet Union is now ruled by a bureaucratic ruling class. Significantly, both Trotsky and Rogovin use the analogy of preventive civil war in order to explain the purge trials, but this conception creates another important question. This is because Marxists define civil war in terms of the conflict between contending social classes. Consequently, Trotsky seems to effectively accept that the increasing (essentially civil war) antagonism between the bureaucracy and working class is an expression of conflict involving opposing class forces:

"The main goal of the Moscow Trials was to create the conditions for politically discrediting and physically exterminating the entire communist opposition in order to behead the population, to deprive it for many years of a political avant-garde and therefore of the ability to resist the totalitarian regime. The class struggle in the USSR assumed, essentially, its sharpest form - civil war. This civil war, unlike the civil war of 1918-20, took the specific form of state terror directed at precluding any political activity by the masses" (p145).

Rogovin outlines thoroughly how Stalin also used terror within the bureaucracy in order to obtain a more conformist and obedient ruling elite. But this process of transformation (and destruction of the 1920s ruling elite) only provides an additional indication that the rule of a new class was being fully consolidated. For the purges ensured the political and ideological homogeneity of the new ruling class.

Rogovin maintains that the unprecedented state terror of Stalinist preventive civil war was still based upon the ideology of the October revolution, which suggests that a degenerated workers' state still remains. But this formal socialism can still be explained as an alienating ideology of a new ruling class. In other words, Rogovin tries to deny the reactionary class content of the social structures in terms of the enduring progressive consciousness of the Soviet people, which the ruling elite have to make concessions to in terms of propagating a formal socialist ideology. Yet Rogovin also describes the repressive, unaccountable and coercive character of the state, which suggests that a new ruling class dominates the working class:

"The scale of the preventive civil war unleashed by Stalin was determined by the strength of the ideas and traditions of the October revolution, which preserved their vitality not only among the popular masses, but among the party apparatchiks, economists, military leaders, and what was needed in order to overcome this force, which had no precedent in history, was state terror which was just as unprecedented in its scale and cruelty. In turn, this terror proved to be possible and effective because it superficially acted not in its genuine counterrevolutionary form, but in a form of social mimicry, under the mask of defending the gains of the October revolution" (p145).

The culminating effect of the counterrevolutionary process of the purges consolidated the rule of the new class over the working class, but Rogovin tries to avoid this conclusion, even though he provides the theoretical justification for this conclusion. His main argument seems to suggest that the consciousness of the working class expressed the gains of the October revolution, such as the actuality of nationalised property relations.

But Rogovin also describes how both the working class and the oppositional Bolshevik groupings were in a situation of political disarray. Stalin had effectively smashed the Left Opposition. The Left Opposition carried out brave resistance to Stalinism in the camps, but it could no longer directly influence Soviet politics. The Right Opposition was atomised. By the mid-1930s the leadership of Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky were no longer friends and had become (formally at least) fervent supporters of Stalin. The centrist leaders Zinoviev and Kamenev mistrusted each other, and were also sycophants of Stalin. Thus the organisational basis for revolutionary leadership of the working class had become atomised, discredited or totally repressed. This meant that any revolutionary aspirations within the working class could not find a political expression, and this situation facilitated Stalinism transforming the working class into a subordinated and exploited class.

The period from 1928-29 to the 1937 purge trials represented a political counterrevolution that facilitated the economic counterrevolution of forced collectivisation and rapid industrialisation. The working class could not challenge this process because it had no effective political leadership as a result of the success of Stalinist repression.

Significant sociological changes also conjuncturally undermined the possibility for revolutionary opposition to Stalinism. A new (non-Bolshevised) working class was being created from the peasants attempting to find an alternative to the poverty and famine of the countryside. There was also rapid social mobility, and this created an objective basis for mass support for the new ruling class. This situation of social flux combined with political repression was not conducive to a rebirth of an effective Bolshevism that could seriously challenge Stalinist domination.

Rogovin gives examples of Stalin's unpopularity within the CPSU, such as the widespread support for the anti-Stalinist Riutin platform (pp233-4). However, the actuality of anti-Stalinist sentiments within the CPSU does not mean that effective opposition was still possible in the 1930s. This was because the various forms of active political opposition had already been suppressed. Indeed Stalin's awareness of continued dislike of his leadership only made him more determined to transform the party and make it a more effective instrument of the rule of the new bureaucratic class.

Significantly, the Trotskyists in the camps started calling the Soviet Union a fascist regime (p376 and p384). Furthermore, the memoirs of N Gagen-Torn indicate that the remaining Soviet Trotskyists defined Stalin's terror as a dictatorship over the working class, and Stalinism represented a regime that was no longer the dictatorship of the proletariat (pp384-385). Rogovin makes no attempt to analyse these comments because it is obvious that they directly challenge Trotsky's class analysis of the USSR. Rogovin shows that the Trotskyists carried out heroic resistance in the camps, but this only reinforces the understanding that Stalinism was an horrific type of oppression and so could not possibly be a form of workers' state (pp374-392).

Rogovin admits to the effectiveness of the purges in relation to the Soviet army generals, who were purged because they had become "the last organised force in the country which was capable of moving against [Stalin]" (p424). Apparently there was a real possibility that an attempt to overthrow Stalin was considered: "The military leaders (evidently in an alliance with several old Bolsheviks) began to prepare the anti-Stalin conspiracy at the end of 1936. Separate rumours, not fully verified and not completely reliable, apparently reached Stalin, who immediately began to prepare a preventive retaliatory strike" (p481).

Rogovin goes so far as to suggest that the overthrow of Stalin by the military was essentially the political revolution: "The generals hardly wanted to establish a military dictatorship in the USSR. They wanted to restore the Bolshevik regime and therefore chose the motif of overthrowing Stalin, which could win over to their side the majority of the CC" (p481).

Obviously the majority of the Soviet people would have welcomed the overthrow of Stalin, the genocidal tyrant. But such an action, if carried out by the military, would not have resolved the problem of ending the consolidated bureaucratic regime. The central committee and military may have ultimately supported the overthrow of Stalin, but they would still have remained instruments of the ruling class. Hence the party and military may have supported Stalin's demise, and would have advocated carrying out a programme of reforms, but they would still have upheld Stalinism without Stalin. In the mid-1930s the generals would have wanted to maintain the hegemony of the new ruling class without personal dictatorship and terror, but there was still a need for proletarian revolution against Stalinism.

A principled revolutionary party would obviously welcome the overthrow of Stalin, but also show that it was still necessary to smash the coercive bureaucratic state apparatus. The precise tactical application of this strategic approach cannot possibly be established in this article, but the necessity to establish the political independence of the proletariat from the bureaucracy would be of crucial importance.

In contrast, Rogovin's approach represents an accommodation to the most progressive sections of the Stalinist ruling class. This is the logical and problematical outcome of the degenerated workers' state theory, or the view that if the political superstructure is progressively changed then the gains of the October revolution (nationalised property) can re-establish a healthy workers' state. This approach glosses over the problem that both the economy and political superstructure have become dominated by the new exploitative ruling class.

Rogovin defends his view that Stalin himself represents the essence of Stalinism through showing that Stalin may have been an agent of the tsarist secret police (pp465-482). If this allegation is true (and Rogovin admits that the evidence remains problematical), then this would only strengthen the understanding that the Soviet Union came to be ruled by a new exploiting class. For it can be assumed (if Stalin had been a police agent, and was now possibly in the service of an imperialist power) that Stalin consciously acted to undermine and destroy the Soviet workers' state (which between 1918 and 1928 can genuinely be defined as a degenerated workers' state).

Stalin was not just an indirect agency of imperialism, but was instead a direct agent who (in the 1920s) consciously and strategically acted to smash the Soviet proletarian revolution and undermine world revolution. Thus forced collectivisation was not initially a pragmatic measure, but was instead planned as a deliberate means to introduce collective serfdom and facilitate the basis of the extraction of a surplus product from an exploited working class and peasantry. The other implications of Stalin's actions as an agent and puppet of imperialism are still too horrific to contemplate.

Trotsky explained to the Dewey Commission (established to investigate Stalin's allegations against Trotskyism) that Stalinism was not Bolshevism and not working class democracy. Stalinism was a system of terror directed against the working class:

"Thus Trotsky explained the transformation and repressions and the accompanying forgeries into a system by the logic of the class struggle which was prompted by the promotion of a new ruling layer whose interests contradicted the traditions and former composition of the Bolshevik Party. The revolutionary struggle for social equality against the old privileged classes was replaced by the establishment of a new system of social inequality and reactionary terror needed for the defence of this system. It was, in essence, a counterrevolutionary revolt, the success of which in no small measure was due to the fact that it was camouflaged with the defensive flag of Bolshevism, of defending the gains of the October revolution" (pp321-322).

Trotsky's equation of the purge trials with the logic of class struggle and class antagonisms is one more indication that he is effectively suggesting that there is a new class dictatorship over the working class. Nevertheless Trotsky is reluctant to make this sociological conclusion from the implicit and essential aspects of his analysis. Tragically, his ultimate political conservatism has facilitated the splitting of the American SWP and contributed to the theoretical and political problems of post-war Trotskyism.

However, it was also the responsibility of Trotskyism after Trotsky to reject dogma, and instead retain the explanatory and most significant aspects of Trotsky's analysis of the class character of the Soviet Union.