03.02.2000

Stalinism rediscovered

Sheila Fitzpatrick (ed) Stalinism - new directions Routledge 2000, £15.99, pp377

Sheila Fitzpatrick is one of the leading exponents of the revisionist school of thought within Soviet studies. This approach challenges the crude anti-communism of the totalitarian theorists. The revisionists use new empirical material about the Soviet Union in order to show the dynamic and changing nature of Soviet society.

Recently revisionism has been influenced by post-structuralist themes, such as constructed identity, which is connected to the work of Foucault. For example, the Soviet state has generated the political and ideological basis of particular national identity. Consequently, nationalism is a modern phenomenon. The question of class and nationalism will be the main focus of the review of this book of revisionist articles.

Sarah Davies has studied the attitudes of Leningrad workers in the 1930s (pp47-70). Despite the claims of the party to be building a classless society Davies found an 'us' and 'them' perspective within the working class as the basis of its self-definition in relation to those who had dominant economic, social and political power. Discontent about the lack of power led the working class to blame scapegoats, and this explains the prevalence of anti-semitic views. The Moscow trials, and the connected purges, only increased distrust within the working class about the party. The party was considered to be remote and inaccessible and full of wreckers. Thus the party was no longer considered to be connected to the working class.

The party was defined by the workers as immoral because it did no productive work, and yet the party still had dominant economic power and this meant the workers remained poor. Hence, the workers felt morally superior to the party, but they were angry about economic exploitation and the consumer privileges of the new elite. Davies's article shows that the working class of the 1930s does not conform to the usual stereotype of being a subservient and atomised mass. Despite the terror the workers were not always afraid about letting the party elite know about their class views and grievances.

However, what is primarily outlined in this study of working class attitudes is an indication of the populist and changing nature of spontaneous consciousness. This does not explain the objective relationship between the new elite and the working class. The workers obviously feel betrayed by the party, and no longer believe that the party acts on the basis of revolutionary and proletarian class interest, but this subjective indignation does not explain the actual and objective class relations of Soviet society.

This theoretical problem of subjectivism also explains why Davies is unable to develop an understanding of Soviet society that goes beyond the spontaneous limitations of the Leningrad workers. For she is generally content to act as an interpreter and critic of the subjective views of the workers, and this means she is reluctant to elaborate a theoretical analysis that can relate the views of the Leningrad workers to the development of a new class society, which still exploits the working class. Ultimately, Davies outlines the views of the workers in terms of individual experience and grievances, not connected to the structural mechanisms of exploitation and alienation of the Soviet Union.

Jochen Hellbech's study of the diary of Stephan Podlubnyi shows the significance of the private identity and views of Soviet citizens (pp71-116). This study of individual subjectivity and self-construction represents a challenge to the generalisations of the totalitarian view of Soviet society as a collection of atomised individuals, and it also questions the early revisionist view of Soviet society being characterised by the social mobility and active agency of an educated working class.

Podlubnyi was the son of a kulak. He aspired to develop as a model Soviet citizen, and he defined his well-being by the actions and decisions of party and state. Culture was associated with the work and aims of the party, and backwardness represented rebellion against the discipline of work and party diktats. Social usefulness was defined by the aims of the party.

So how was it he became increasingly critical, and yet did not reject the belief system of the party? His rationalisation was that the party's policies were increasingly in conflict with its aims and goals. The arrest of his mother led him to be increasingly critical of the party regime, but he still broadly supported the values and aims of the party to develop society. His individual subjectivity cannot be separated from the role and meaning of the social, even though he was increasingly critical of the leadership of the state.

These diaries do provide important insights about the aspirations and disappointments of those Soviet citizens who most fervently believed in the 'new socialist society'. The terror of the mid-1930s led Podlubnyi to question the leading role of the party. How was it possible that his mother, who had been a faithful supporter of the party, could be accused of treason against the party and state? Unfortunately, Hellbech's study does not suggest how Podlubnyi could try to resolve the dilemmas of his own private anguish, and instead we are presented with a self-contained world of inner thoughts and actions that cannot overcome the problems of individual isolation.

Hence, Podlubnyi is portrayed as retreating even further into his own world after the tragic repression suffered by his mother. Consequently, whilst the individual motivations and ideas of Podlubnyi are outlined in illuminating detail, his relations with his friends, party and work colleagues remain obscure. We do know that he initially has a snobbish and elitist disdain for workers and peasants, but we do not know whether his family tragedy led him to identify in more egalitarian terms with these exploited classes.

Thus the microscopic detail of individual studies can provide both an obscurantist and illuminating expression of the relationship of the individual to the social and collective. It is still necessary to go beyond the inherently limited and self-absorbed world of the individual if more general and substantial conclusions are to be reached about Soviet society.

Julie Hessler indicates how the culture of consumerism helps us to understand the ideology and privileges of the new elite (pp182-209). By the mid-1930s there had developed a new thoughtful consumer who was able to choose from a sophisticated range of goods. The Stakhanovite became an example of a new affluent working class consumer, although the majority of the working class did not have a high enough standard of living to become this new type of consumer.

Vadim Volkov shows how the large influx of peasants into the cities in the 1930s led to an official campaign to make this urbanised peasantry more cultured in appearance, hygiene, book-learning and film appreciation (pp210-230). This campaign was carried out in order to uphold public order and work discipline. By 1938 there was a new emphasis upon internal self-development through political education.

These studies show that the modernisation of society was in the interests of the Soviet ruling elite. They wanted to create a new and cultured working class that acted with enthusiasm in relation to carrying out the economic aims of the five-year plan. The Stakhanovite movement represented a deliberate attempt to create a Soviet labour aristocracy. This process of social differentiation aimed at creating a layer of Soviet workers with a material interest in supporting the system, and hopefully the other sections of the working class would aspire to be socially conforming Stakhanovites.

Hessler does not relate the unequal consumption levels within Soviet society to the historically specific social relations of production. Hence her study emphasises the role of consumption and distribution almost to the exclusion of production. The inequality at the level of consumption is an expression of the development of new class relations that are primarily located at the level of production. The higher material standard of living of the Stakhanovites is linked to their higher levels of productivity, which enables a greater level of surplus product to be extracted from the working class. Without this functional economic role it would not be possible to materially remunerate the Stakhano-vites in generous terms. The ideology of 'socialism' is linked to the connected economic and political interests of the party elite, managers and Stakhano-vites. This point is not made sufficiently by Hessler's generally 'consumerist' analysis.

Volkov has carried out a valuable study of how it was necessary to 'discipline' and 'educate' the peasantry in relation to the purpose of being transformed into workers that carry out the tasks of the Soviet industrial revolution. Hence the Soviet ruling elite was a substitute for the capitalist class: they inaugurated the process of development of the productive forces and surplus extraction in a non-capitalist form. This development led to the modernisation of Soviet society, and the cultural revolution of the 1930s.

But the Soviet elite was not historically progressive because modernisation was a catastrophic process that benefited a minority, and meant hardship, famine and poverty for the majority. The party and skilled section of the working class did benefit from the cultural revolution and modernisation, but the majority was still excluded and marginalised. This situation was similar to the class polarisation and differentiation of the advanced capitalist societies.

Yuri Slezkine maintains that the Stalinist Communist Party consistently promoted national identity, languages, territorial rights and the particular cultures of the many nationalities of the Soviet Union (pp313-347). Therefore the question of accommodation to bourgeois nationalism was generally connected to the failure to carry out the tasks of the party, such as during the period of collectivisation. Despite the increasing identity of the Great Russian people with the Soviet Union during the 1930s, the cultural traditions of the various nationalities were still officially promoted.

In the period of the intense repression of supposedly 'disloyal' nationalities Stalin still confirmed (in 1950) the desirability of diverse languages, as an aspect of specific nationality. The policy of promoting nationality led to the rule of national elites in the various republics, which helped to facilitate the realisation of national self-determination when the Soviet Union fragmented.

Slezkine indicates that nationality is an aspect of the modernisation process of the development of the Soviet Union. The Soviet ruling elite facilitated the national emergence of the many suppressed nationalities of the former tsarist Russian empire. However, the relationship between the economic and political centralisation of the Soviet Union and the status of the various national republics and autonomous territories is not analysed.

The promotion of national identity was not an expression of the enlightenment of the Soviet ruling elite, but was primarily an expression of economic requirements. Regional and national elites were necessary in order to facilitate the realisation of the particular requirements of the five-year plans. Obviously, it was not possible to get support for the economic aims of the plan without ideological consensus, and this meant national culture and identity were promoted as an important aspect of obtaining popular consent for the purpose of realising the plan.

In the period when the economic basis for ideological consensus was not possible, such as during the era of forced collectivisation, the Soviet elite were indifferent to the famine taking place in the Ukraine. Thus the possibility of realising national aspirations was linked to the general economic situation within the Soviet Union. Formally national cultural freedom flourished in periods of economic prosperity, but in a situation of economic crisis 'national rights' were not recognised, and national discontent would be ruthlessly suppressed. In general terms the Soviet elite was willing to encourage national culture, but it opposed all attempts to realise national self-determination. This was because the right of national self-determination was disruptive in relation to the fulfilment of the aims of the five-year plan, and in relation to the process of surplus extraction.

Terry Martin contends that the Soviet Union promoted the 'high culture' of modernisation, which includes education and industrialisation (pp348-367). On this basis the Soviet Union would become integrated, and overcome particularist tensions of diverse nationality:

"National identity would be depoliticised by an ostentatious demonstration of respect for the national identities of all Soviet citizens. This would in turn allow the Soviet state to demonstrate the superiority of its newly emerging socialist high culture without provoking a nationalist backlash. The eventual universal acceptance of this high culture would result, over the very long term, in the gradual disappearance of separate national identities (though how exactly this would occur always remained shrouded in mystery). Of course, such a development was impossible, given a popular understanding of nations as primordial. Thus, the Soviet nationalities policy also represented a pedagogical effort to move the Soviet population from the popular understanding of nations as primordial and immutable to the Bolsheviks' own sociological understanding of nations as historical and contingent. The Communist Party would act not only as the vanguard of the working class, but the vanguard of Soviet nations as well: guiding them through the phrase of modernisation and national identity to socialism and transcendence of national identity" (p354).

The Soviet elite has the aim of overcoming primordial or enduring national myths that conflict with the modern message of the Soviet Union and its intention to ultimately transcend separate nationality. But the official party policy defined people according to nationality in legal terms, such as passport, type of education, and the promotion of particular national languages. This meant an ascribed (official) national status began to be expressed in primordial terms of ancient myths and folk culture.

The increased emphasis on the importance of nations in late 1930s ideology led to the triumph of the primordial conception in official ideology. Russia was historically considered to be the patriotic nation of the Soviet Union that was threatened by traditional enemies, such as Germany. This chauvinist standpoint led to the repression of 'disloyal' Soviet nationalities. In ideological terms there was the paradox of the Soviet elite trying to promote a modernist high culture, whilst justifying an ascribed and primordial nation status based upon national myths. In other words the Soviet state was created as an outcome of neo-traditional primordial national identities.

Martin brilliantly shows that 'nation' is a social and ideological construct connected to the conscious policy of a political state entity. Hence the nation is not a 'natural' product of a common language, territorial area or the economic development of a capitalist or 'socialist' economy.

If we apply his approach to the period of bourgeois revolution it could be argued that the Cromwellian state established a distinctive national identity based upon support for imperialist expansionism and exclusive ethnic chauvinism. This nationalism was connected to primordial myths about England (later Britain) having a mission to advance the protestant ideology on a global scale. The justification of international conflict between protestant nations, as occurred between England and Holland, was linked to the competitive and protectionist standpoint of mercantile capital. Thus an English national identity, linked to the consolidation of primordial myths, was established well before the period of the rapid development of industrial capitalism and the onset of the monopoly capital stage of imperialism.

The economic basis of these myths may rapidly become antiquated, but they acquire an almost timeless and enduring quality because of the popular and dominating quality of nationalism. Consequently, the hegemony of nationalist ideology in an era of globalised production, that economically makes the nation state redundant, is connected to the enduring character of primordial myths.

These myths may express 'false consciousness' because they are not accurately related to modern social processes that show the transitory content of nation states, but their dominating ideological role means that internationalism seems to be abstract and 'unrealistic'. It is the task of revolutionary Marxism to develop the theoretical basis to oppose enduring national myths (and possibly this requires the development of revolutionary myths) in relation to the task of developing an internationalist alternative to nationalism.