20.01.2000

All power to Putin?

As we go to press, Russian headquarters in Mozdok has announced that "the decisive phase in the liberation of Grozny has begun". Nearly four weeks after the first 'final' assault - in which a combination of poor combat-readiness and tactical ineptitude, on the one side, and fierce guerrilla attacks, on the other, resulted in a steep rise in Russian dead and wounded - another 'decisive' engagement is announced. Perhaps this time they will succeed in taking the city, but only at the cost of hundreds, perhaps thousands more young conscripts' lives - and even if the assault is successful, it will be the end of a battle, but by no means the end of this dirty war.

The second Chechen war has been the making of VV Putin: it has brought him a level of unprecedented popularity, ensured him the acting presidency and created the prospects for success in the March 26 presidential elections. But if this campaign has taught us anything, it is that Chechnya will not easily be subdued and held. In the long term Chechnya could be Putin's nemesis, but fundamental changes in the balance of political forces signalled by the December 19 duma elections - changes that look likely to set Russia on a new course - should guarantee that he becomes the second president of the post-Soviet Russian Federation.

The lessons of recent weeks have much to tell us about what still might go wrong. On January 7 the general staff announced a temporary suspension of the Grozny offensive. Confused and contradictory explanations for this surprising development were given: Putin attributed it to respect for the Russian orthodox Christmas and the muslim feast of Eid al-Fitr and suggested the pause was intended to safeguard civilians trying to flee the capital. Military spokesmen said that chemical weapons allegedly being deployed by Chechen "terrorists" had turned Grozny into an "ecological danger zone", and that in any case it was necessary to shift the focus of operations to the mountains south of Grozny in order to destroy rebel strongholds.

The real reason was that front-line forces needed to regroup after sustaining unacceptably high casualties. On January 14, the official figure of dead stood at 741, whilst on the same day Pravda put the figure at around 1,300. The true figures are probably somewhere around those reported by Valentina Melnikova, a member of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, speaking on January 16: namely some 3,000 killed and 6,000 wounded.

Further confusion was created by the announcement that lieutenant-general Gennadiy Troshev and major-general Vladimir Shamanov - commanders respectively of the eastern and western battle groups - had been relieved of their commands. Troshev confirmed this, saying that "It is time to give others a chance to show what they can do" (The Independent January 10). Other military spokesmen spoke of a "routine rotation" of commanders, as if this were quite normal in the middle of a vital operation. Putin flatly denied that Troshev and Shamanov had been sacked at all. Colonel-general Viktor Kazantsev later told the media that the officers had been "reinstated". Only an acute crisis of confidence in the conduct of the war and consequent tension between the political and military leadership could have produced such muddle, and it is unlikely to be the last.

In the meantime, Chechen guerrilla formations took advantage of the situation to seize the initiative. The Russians' failure to seal off Grozny meant that thousands of fighters were able to break out and form small, lightly armed and highly mobile units to launch damaging counterattacks in Gudermes, Argun, Shali, Urus-Martan, Chervlennaya and Mersky-Yurt. In a change of strategy confirmed by the Chechen defence minister Magomed Khambiyev, Chechen forces have moved from defensive positional fighting to full-scale partisan warfare, attacking behind the Russian lines in order to pick off units piecemeal, and disrupt lines of communication and supply. The Russian response after the resumption of the bombardment of Grozny has been to commit 40,000 more troops to the theatre, bringing their total forces to somewhere approaching 150,000. It is, however, very doubtful whether sheer weight of men and material can do anything to bring a quick end to the war.

Given the deteriorating situation, it is not surprising that some sections of the Russian media - hitherto unanimous in its support for the war - have begun to voice strong criticism. The state-owned TV station ORT still plays down Russian losses and Nezavisimaya Gazeta, owned by the media mogul Boris Berezovsky, exults in the "end of geopolitical retreat after 10 years". The influential NTV commercial station, however, which was instrumental in turning public opinion against the 1994-1996 war, has begun to focus on military funerals and speaks of a "sudden and unpleasant turn of events", while charging the military with attempts to harass and gag its reporters. Izvestia, a paper that backed Putin in the recent elections, devoted the front page of its January 10 issue to a bitter condemnation of military incompetence and stated: "There can no longer be any talk of successful special operations in Chechnya." Where the media leads, politicians are never far behind. The former prime minister Sergei Stepashin has warned the Russian public to expect a "long, drawn-out and painful terrorist war" and Anatoly Kulikov, a former interior minister who commanded Russian forces in Chechnya in 1995, told reporters that "This will be our Ulster" and could last for years.

It is against this background that we must assess Putin's prospects in the presidential elections and his recent policy pronouncements. Those who see the second Chechen war as posing a potentially fatal threat to Putin's chances in the March presidential poll need to bear two things in mind: first, the outcome of the duma elections; secondly, the absence of any other credible candidate for the office. They might also take note that his popularity rating among the Russian people is still around 75%.

So far as the duma is concerned, half of the lower house was elected on the party list system and half on the basis of individual mandate constituencies. Only six of the 26 party blocs that contested the election succeeded in clearing the five percent barrier required to gain seats, and the results - on a turnout of 62% - were as follows: Communist Party of the Russian Federation: 24.29%, 67 seats; Unity: 23.32% - 64; Fatherland/All Russia: 13.33% - 37; Union of Right Forces: 8.52% - 24; Zhirinovsky Bloc: 5.98% - 17; Yabloko: 5.98% -16.

Taking into account the fact that many of the 225 seats in the single constituency section were fought by independents, who have the right to join any duma faction of their choice, a period of negotiation will take place before the final composition of the duma is known, but on the basis of projections by NTV, the distribution of seats will look something like the following: Communist Party of the Russian Federation: 150-160 seats; Unity: 120-130; Fatherland/All Russia: 65-70; Union of Right Forces: 30; Yabloko: 25; Zhirinovsky Bloc: 18.

At first glance, it might seem that the CPRF vote held up well - in fact it raised its share of the party list vote by two percentage points. But this would be an illusion. The result represents a serious setback for them in two respects: its former duma allies, the Agrarian Party and Popular Rule, failed to win anything, and, more significantly, an alliance between Unity and the Union of Right Forces, together with an already sizeable number of opportunist defectors from Fatherland/All Russia to Unity, the putative 'party of government', means that the CPRF will no longer be able to dictate the duma agenda. However much CPRF leader Gennadiy Zyuganov may try to put a brave face on the outcome, his long-term prospects look far from secure. His party is likely to face an identity crisis, and a split cannot be ruled out. The election was similarly disappointing for the so-called 'centre-left' bloc, Fatherland/All Russia, headed by Moscow's re-elected mayor Yuriy Luzhkov and former prime minister Yevgeniy Primakov, who seem to have lost millions of voters to Unity.

The performance of the newly-formed Union of Right Forces, led by former prime minister Sergei Kiriyenko, who presided over the rouble's massive devaluation in 1988, and backed by Anatoly Chubais, Boris Nemtsov and Yegor Gaidar, was surprisingly good, given the fact that these were the architects of the economic 'reforms' and the rigged privatisations which have left nearly half the Russian population living below the official poverty line.

It is, of course, the astounding success of Unity that constitutes the most significant aspect of the duma election. Lacking a programme and having no infrastructure whatsoever, Unity (known in Russia as Medved - Bear) cannot be called a party at all. It was created only a few months ago, under the leadership of Sergei Konstantinovich Shoigu, the emergencies minister and Yeltsin favourite, purely as a vehicle to defend the Kremlin 'family' interest. The money and media muscle came from Boris Berezovsky - now a member of the duma and hence immune for the next four years from prosecution on charges relating to massive corruption. Unity's success in the poll, coming within one percent of the CPRF's list vote, is the clearest indication that the election, though free, was certainly not fair. In the days before the December 19 voting, Russian TV output amounted to little more than one long party political broadcast in favour of Unity. Putin's endorsement of the 'party', though he himself is not a member, was probably decisive.

Small wonder, in the light of the above, that international capital, as represented by The Times, expressed its satisfaction with the election results and described "the prospect of constructive dialogue between the executive and the legislature in Russia" as "a very welcome development" (December 21). All parties in the new duma, including the CPRF, have declared that they are in favour of further economic reform: ie, yet another attempt to establish and consolidate some kind of viable capitalist system. Putin has already announced far-reaching structural reforms of the law concerning land and property ownership.

Whatever the outcome of current operations in Chechnya, it seems certain that the new disposition of political forces in the duma will safeguard Putin from a vote of no confidence in his premiership and acting presidency in the run-up to the presidential elections in nine weeks time. His prospects are further enhanced by the field of candidates who have so far indicated that they will contest the election. On any measure, Zyuganov cannot be expected to win. Zhirinovsky, even though he has mellowed somewhat from the days when his grotesquely misnamed Liberal Democrats promised free vodka for all Russian men and free men for all Russian women, is a rank outsider. The only 'serious' contender was the 70-year-old Yegeniy Primakov of Fatherland/All Russia, but even before his party's poor performance in the parliamentary elections, his ill-health and associations with the Soviet era were being avidly seized upon by opponents and he has now suggested that he would prefer to stand for the post of speaker of the duma, which leaves the 'centre-left' without a candidate.

Given the overwhelming probability of a Putin victory, we already have some clear indications of just what kind of state he hopes to build. Abroad the emphasis will be on a nationalist, if not xenophobic, and much more aggressive and confrontational stance towards US imperialism and Nato. At home, it will be on an authoritarian, centralised state, reining in the power of the country's 89 regional governors and instituting further market reforms while trying to pacify the demoralised and impoverished people with populist measures focused on an attempt to root out corruption and improve basic living standards. It need hardly be said that many aspects of this policy stance are mutually contradictory.

Presidential decree No24, issued last week, has, not surprisingly, aroused concern in western capitals, as it enshrines a fundamental redraft of Russia's defence doctrine. The document describes the combat-readiness of Russia's armed forces as "critically low" and promises an increase of almost 60% in defence spending. At its core is the determination to rebuild a "great, powerful and strong" Russian state that, in alliance with such countries as China, India and other 'third world' countries, will act as a 'multipolar' counterbalance to the 'unipolar' domination of the world by the United States, unequivocally seen as a hostile power. The policy of "expanded nuclear containment" envisaged by the decree implies the abandonment of the so-called 'partnership for peace' that underlay the country's defence doctrine under Yeltsin.

Whereas the old doctrine determined that nuclear weapons would only be used "in the case of a threat to the very existence of the Russian Federation as a sovereign state", the new document postulates that they could be employed "to repel armed aggression if all other means of resolving a crisis situation have been exhausted or turn out to be ineffective". Russian military spokesmen were quick to qualify the implications of the new position and perhaps it is, after all, no more than part of Putin's electioneering platform, but it must nonetheless be taken seriously. What we have here is the reaction to 10 years of arrogant and woefully short-sighted western foreign policy - especially the eastward expansion of Nato to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic - that has aroused deep-seated fears of another 'encirclement'.

At home, Putin's endorsement of a new "security concept" - ie, the fundamental restructuring and enlargement of the intelligence and security organs purportedly to deal primarily with "terrorism", but also with organised crime and corruption - suggests a measure that, while aimed at winning popular appeal, is objectively directed towards the creation of a police state. As Putin put it in a speech to senior intelligence officers at the Lubyanka on December 20, anniversary of the foundation of the Cheka and formerly known in the USSR as KGB Day, "A few years ago we fell victim to the illusion that we have no enemies. This cost us dearly. Russia has its national interests and we have to defend them" (The Times January 13). In this context, comments by the secretary of the Kremlin security council, Sergei Ivanov, that the Putin administration was considering placing curbs on the media should be taken as a clear warning signal.

Another populist measure in the shape of a 20% wage increase for all public sector workers is hard to take seriously, as they are still owed billions of roubles in wage arrears and have little prospect of ever receiving them. The doubling of the oil price over the last year has given Russia some much needed revenue, but the drain on resources created by the Chechen war, plans for increased defence spending and the need to meet debt repayments to foreign banks will soon exhaust the country's increased income. As always, it will be the Russian working class that ends up paying for Putin's Great Russian chauvinist dreams.