17.06.1999
Reform incomplete
Indonesian elections
Just over a year after president Suharto was toppled from power by a mass movement for democracy and reformasi total, Indonesia has held relatively free and fair elections. The local elite and international financial interests are breathing more easily now. However, the plethora of democratic, national and economic problems facing Indonesia are far from being resolved and could cause a new eruption at any moment.
With almost 60% of the vote counted, Megawati Sukarnoputri’s Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) looks certain to be the largest fraction in the new parliament. Megawati’s party has so far gained 35.8% of the vote. In what will be a shock to some, the second party is likely to be Golkar, the widely discredited ‘above class’ movement of ex-president Suharto and of incumbent BJ Habibie. Golkar has around 21% of the vote as counted.
Despite the lead of Megawati’s party, it is as yet unclear just what coalition will form the government. A bloc of the three predominant opposition figures seems most likely with Amien Rais’s National Mandate Party (PAN) gaining 7.76% and the National Awakening Party (PKB) of Islamic leader Abdurrahman Wahid, registering 12.2%. Nevertheless, given that the military has an uncontested 38 seats in the 500-seat parliament, it may yet be possible for Golkar to squeak back supported by the army and smaller factions. The chance of this is increased, given that late returning voting figures will predominantly come from rural areas where Golkar is stronger.
However, the Islamic forces each have their own agenda. PKB leader Wahid told The Australian newspaper: “If you don’t elect Megawati you will have riots. If you do elect Megawati you face the same problem” (June 15). He said Megawati’s candidacy would be opposed by some Muslim groups, which are firmly opposed to a woman becoming president. Wahid also insisted there were problems with alternative candidates, including incumbent president Habibie, Amien Rais and armed forces commander general Wiranto.
Senior PAN officials have said its leader Amien Rais had ruled out any coalition with either Golkar or the PDI-P. However, this is surely more to do with positioning in the lead-up to coalition negotiations.
This election, while far short of a revolution, is born of a revolutionary situation. Its timing and conduct are designed to stabilise Indonesia under liberal bourgeois hegemony as the dominant families and their system try to survive an economic crisis, the toppling of a despised dictator and centripetal forces from armed national liberation movements. Because of this background, given that the political process is attempting to placate the mass democratic movement, the elections are marked with an imprint from below. There is a mass hunger for real change.
The vote was on the basis of a party list system: elections were by proportional representation with people being eligible to vote at 17, or younger if married. The day of the vote, June 7, was a national holiday in order to overcome the culture of employers overseeing how their workers vote - normally for Golkar. In addition, prisoners are eligible to stand - a right denied UK subjects after the stunning election of IRA hunger striker and martyr Bobby Sands. The left-wing Peoples’ Democratic Party (PRD) put their imprisoned chairman on the top of its list in Jakarta.
According to most pundits, what has been remarkable about the probable victory of Megawati is her total lack of policy in the lead-up to the polls. In fact, the only policy statements she made seemed to place her to the right of the incumbent, president Habibie. Speaking to Time magazine about the nature of change in Indonesia in the week before the election Megawati said:
“Don’t talk about radical change in this place. There are so many islands in Indonesia where conditions are very fragile. Radical change will only make things more difficult ... Problems in East Timor have developed to the stage that [independence] might encourage others to follow. The current government has taken steps too hastily. This might create new problems in the future, destabilise the entire country and prevent us from getting out of this economic crisis.”
Megawati has even made conciliatory noises regarding prosecution for corruption of the man who removed her from the leadership of the PDI in 1996, ex-president Suharto. The new Indonesian president will be elected in November by both houses of parliament and, depending on the outcome of the elections, there is the possibility of Megawati running for president with general Wiranto, currently defence minister, as her vice-president. Wiranto was head of the armed forces under Suharto.
This should come as no surprise. Megawati, daughter of the first Indonesian president, Sukharno, comes from praetorian stock and is a confirmed nationalist, staunchly opposed to the liberation movements in East Timor, West Papua and Aceh in northern Sumatra. Her successful election, far from being of concern to the ruling class, is perhaps the best outcome for a neo-liberal capitalist and nationalist Indonesia. Change to prevent change is preferable for the country’s tiny and immensely rich elite. And they are not alone.
According to Martin Anidjar, an Asian debt analyst at Wall Street stockbroker JP Morgan,
“The best result would be a majority vote for the opposition, not because I think the Golkar party would be bad, but because there is already too much hope in the population for an end to this regime.”
According to Reuters, most financial analysts believe that “a win by the ruling Golkar party could spark riots by those opposed to the party that ruled Indonesia with an iron hand under former president Suharto. Rioting would likely sour interest among investors who crave stability” (June 3). It is in this context that Megawati has been downplaying popular expectations of a PDI-P-led government. However, whereas Blair was able to degrade hopes in a Labour government in Britain, it is unlikely that Megawati will have the same success. Yet much of Megawati’s politicking has been designed to placate the military, especially on the issue of East Timor. While she seems to have succeeded with the military, the appetite of her supporters on the ground will not be so easily satisfied.
A prominent commentator on Indonesian affairs, who writes anonymously for Joyo Indonesian News, visited East Timor at the time of Megawati’s election stop there; this surprising move on the last days of the campaign (given that the province only has four seats) was done purely for the consumption of the military. Nevertheless, the popular mood is all too evident.
While Megawati was visiting Nobel peace prize winner bishop Belo
“A small group of young men painted in PDI-P’s red peered through bishop Belo’s iron gate surrounding his compound. ‘Are you PDI supporters?’ ‘Yes,’ they responded. ‘Are you pro-integration?’ ‘No, we want independence.’ ‘But Megawati has not spoken out in favour of independence. So why are you here supporting her?’ ‘We’re here to let her know how we feel and what we want’.”
Interestingly then, the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post warned that the “vote may spark [a] crisis of expectations” (June 4 1999). Expectations in Megawati exist not just as the figurehead of opposition to the current government, but to decades of Golkar rule.
And it is with this in mind that any revolutionary force must place itself strategically. The PRD, which called for a government of the reactionaries - Rais, Megawati and Gus Dur - during the revolutionary upsurge that toppled Suharto has thankfully altered course.
Its minimum demands now include: the complete withdrawal of the military from political life, the prosecution of Suharto and Habibie and the state confiscation of ‘ill-gotten’ gains, a 100% pay rise, self-determination for East Timor, Aceh and West Papua and for the formation of local committees fighting for a transitional government for total reform.
As one of the 48 parties which successfully registered for these elections, the PRD stood, so far gaining 54,259 votes (0.08% - exactly the same percentage as that achieved by the ‘Weekly Worker’ list in the June 10 EU elections). In Jakarta, the PRD’s vote is 0.2%. While this may seem disappointing, for a small organisation facing a situation where the working class and most radical elements in the population have big expectations in Megawati, the result is not surprising. It is how the PRD and any other revolutionary elements position themselves in the period after the election that will be most important.
If Golkar manage to squeeze back into power there will be all hell to pay. Denying victory to Megawati and the PDI-P through a rural democratic counterrevolution will surely provoke another social upheaval. Megawati has shown herself quite capable of maintaining her millions of supporters when they feel she is leading them forward. But the masses would instantly escape her control if they took to the streets.
Any outcome that unfairly denies the PDI-P victory is to relight the fire. The revolutionary situation will then take its own course.
Yet a Megawati victory does not necessarily amount to a peaceful resolution - though this is possible. Like Pandora’s box, a Megawati victory will unleash all sorts of uncontrollable class, national, democratic and reactionary forces. Indonesia is therefore still a country where the ruling class cannot rule in the old way and where the masses refuse to be ruled in the old way.
Marcus Larsen