24.01.2008
In defence of Popper
Is Karl Popper an example of "intellectually dishonest anti-Marxism"? Bob Potter replies to Jack Conrad
'The uses and abuses of Jesus’ - the second chapter of Jack Conrad’s newly published Fantastic reality - provides a useful overview of constantly evolving relationships between religious beliefs, institutions and society (Weekly Worker December 20).
Jack tells us that “the cause of the working class needs the unvarnished truth about the past in all its concreteness, class antagonisms and world-historic personalities revealed in all their complexity”. However, he continues: “In contrast our rulers prefer Karl Popper’s intellectually dishonest anti-Marxism” - a comment better fitting the writings of the late CPGB/Stalinist ‘philosopher’, Maurice Cornforth.1
The work of Karl Popper has such broad implications and applications in today’s academic world, it is worthy of much more serious attention than the occasional snide comments frequently found in the Weekly Worker, of which this is the latest. In these brief comments, I will address aspects that will impinge upon the experience of any current science student; the naive reader should take the trouble to read a little of Popper himself, before accepting at face value comments such as Jack’s.
Not surprisingly, Popper came under attack from traditional Marxists following publication of The open society and its enemies (1945). For a short time he had been a Marxist - his criticism of Marx (and Marxism) is thorough and informed; he knows his material and writes as a ‘philosopher of science’, arguing that neither the growth of knowledge nor its historical effects are predictable in a scientific sense. In general, he finds advocates of theories such as these committed to a ‘mystical’ belief in a ‘general evolutionary law’; the goal of social scientists being to ‘discover’ this law. Popper asserts scientific method should apply to both nature and society in the same way - social science can formulate laws that make clear the unintended consequences of human actions, but there can be no laws of the whole system.
As contributors to the Weekly Worker and other ‘leftwing’ journals regularly make similar pejorative remarks vis-à-vis Popper, his important clarification of ‘how we do science’ continues to be overlooked in journals of the traditional left. Not only do I believe there is no contradiction between the ‘methodology’ proposed by Popper and the ‘practice’ of most Marxists I have known, but, at the present stage of human understanding, the Popperian approach is, to my mind, the only one commensurate with ‘a scientific approach’.
Constructing knowledge of the world
The history of humankind consists of man’s (and woman’s!) attempt to ‘construct knowledge’ of the world. Man is an active being - in the labour process he uses his physical body and skills to constantly build and remake his environment. In this process, he not only invented ‘artificial organs’, called ‘tools’, but developed his mental aptitudes to react effectively on the environment; his main organ for this ‘mental tool’ being the ‘mind/brain’.
‘Knowledge’ we (individually and collectively) construct within our brains/minds … a constant search for additional ‘facts’, which become ‘building blocks’ for constructing ‘theories of knowledge’ (etymology of the word ‘fact’ is something that is ‘made’!) In a deeper sense, as one of Popper’s pupils (Imre Lakatos) was to say, all facts are theories! The products of ‘science’, the theories, concepts, substances, natural laws, forces, formed from our experiences with the natural world, are creations of the mental labour of humanity - a view in striking contrast to the ‘mechanical materialism’ of the traditional scientific investigator, who sees all these as elements of nature itself, ‘discovered’ by science.
The formation of abstract concepts, rules and laws of nature, in everyday life as well as science, is an intuitive process, functioning to save brain work - an economy of thinking. If contradictions appear, in our conceptions of atoms or space-time, they lie not in nature, but in the formulations we have created for our abstractions to have them readily available for everyday application.
A simple illustration of the uses (and problems) associated with our mental constructs when we explore the world about us is the ‘impossible’ Penrose triangle. Although the image on the retina is two-dimensional, as we inhabit a three-dimensional world, the brain, with its preconceptions, insists on ‘interpreting’ the triangle as a three-dimensional object. Each ‘angle’ in this illustration, where three lines intersect, is interpreted three-dimensionally, but this interpretation, in our culture, ensures we are faced with insoluble contradictions Hence we see an impossible triangle. Field experiments with subjects living in open (not three-dimensional) surroundings, have less difficulty coping with this ‘impossible object’.
In the laboratory, we can show an individual an impossible triangle and monitor eye movements as it is viewed. All respond in a similar way, focusing from point to point, tracing a path around and around the diagram, seeking to match the retinal image with a pre-existing mental schema - this frustrating, non-ending motion would not accompany viewing a ‘possible’ object, thus demonstrating that perception (precursor of ‘knowledge acquisition’) is very much an active process.
One does not just sit back and passively ‘look’, awaiting an input of information. Rather we cast mental hypotheses as to what we expect to see - if the anticipated ‘thing’ is not there, the search continues; possibly ending in the modification of the original hypothesised object: ie, the ‘discovery’ of something ‘new’.
Inventing theories
This is a good starting point to say something about the contribution of Karl Popper to the philosophy of science. It is his starting point: “ … theory - at least some rudimentary theory or expectation - always comes first; that it always precedes observation; and that the fundamental role of observations and experimental tests is to show that some of our theories are false, and so to stimulate us to produce better ones.”2
Popper sent his paper dealing with this question to Albert Einstein in 1935; Einstein agreed with him: “I regard it as trivial that one cannot, in the range of atomic magnitudes, make predictions with any desired degree of precision, and I think (like you, by the way) that theory cannot be fabricated out of the results of observation, but that it can only be invented.”3
So how do our ‘theories’ originate? Not as untypical as we might like to believe is the true story told by John Eccles (Nobel prize for brain/neurophysiology in 1963); it concerns Otto Loewi, who dreamed about an experiment on the chemical transmission from the vagus nerve to the frog heart. He remembered the dream next morning, but had forgotten all details. The following night he took a pencil and paper to bed; the dream came again and he quickly wrote notes about it - but later, when he got up, could not make head nor tail of his notes. On the third night he decided not to trust pencil and paper; he fully awakened and leapt out of bed to write a detailed experimental plan. The experiment was carried out immediately; it was successful and for this discovery Loewi was awarded the Nobel prize in 1936.4
Do not misunderstand the point being made here. Of course, most theories are generated by individuals working in the relevant field of research. However, in the final analysis, the source of the theory is irrelevant … it becomes a scientific theory as soon as it becomes ‘testable’. With this in mind, Popper emphasises the need to clearly formulate our theories:
“Be as clear as you can about the various theories you hold, and be aware that we all hold theories unconsciously, or take them for granted, although most of them are almost certain to be false. Try again and again to formulate the theories which you are holding and to criticise them. And try to construct alternative theories - alternatives even to those theories which appear to you inescapable; for only in this way will you understand the theories you hold ... and look upon your experiments always as tests of a theory - as attempts to find faults in it, and to overthrow it … there is no point in discussing or criticising a theory unless we try all the time to put it in its strongest form, and to argue against it only in that form.”5
Is a theory scientific?
A ‘good’ theory, whatever its origin, from religious mythology or modern astrology (many important scientific theories originated from sources as ‘disreputable’ as that of Loewi, described above!), and no matter how well it is formulated, is ‘good’ to the extent it provokes testable predictions. All viable scientific theories have this feature in common. This is the demarcation Popper draws between science and non-science. Can the theory, in general, or the hypotheses, specifically, be tested and possibly falsified?
Marxist critics of Popper seem to have difficulty understanding the demarcation Popper is making. His ideas are simply presented in his article, ‘Science as falsification’,6 where he makes clear he is not necessarily doubting ‘the truth’ of three theories (Marxism, Freudian and Adlerian psychology), nor that they lacked ‘explanatory power’; but they failed to evoke testable (falsifiable) hypotheses. Discussion with a Freudian, Marxist or theologian was unproductive because, whatever theory-based ‘prediction’ they made, whatever the eventual outcome, their ‘theories’ provided easy options/explanations for ‘explaining away’ a disappointing outcome. The underlying theory remained intact!
According to Popper, science progresses by means of developing ‘better’ theories from which more critical hypotheses can be postulated and tested. In principle, an hypothesis (and hence a theory) can never be proved - only supported by the data provided.
A classic demonstration of this changed viewpoint: for hundreds of years the theory and hypotheses originating in Newton’s work on motion were ‘proved’, again, again and again. Then, one fine day in May 1919, that bastard Einstein not only hypothesised Newton’s theory was wrong, but inspired a stellar photographic expedition to Africa to test the theories. Einstein’s theory was vindicated. Repeatedly, Einstein warned scientists of Newton’s fundamental mistake: “We now realise, with special clarity, how much in error are those theorists who believe that theory comes inductively from experience. Even the great Newton could not free himself from this error (Hypotheses non fingo - I make no hypotheses)”.7
Real progress in knowledge takes place when a ‘universally accepted’ hypothesis is convincingly tested and not supported, highlighting the need to modify/improve the hypothesis/theory. Not surprisingly, general acceptance and understanding of later theoretical developments often lag behind those working in the field (amongst whom, anyway, there is generally much bitter argument!). The Einsteinian revolution has been and is a good example of this.
Einstein acknowledged his debt to Ernst Mach (1838-1916), among others, for his earlier work in this field. Leninists will be familiar with the name of Mach, for he is one of the anti-heroes of Lenin’s Materialism and empirio-criticism. The Bolshevik leader takes Mach to task for rejecting Newton’s acceptance of ‘absolute space’ and ‘absolute time’ in contrast to the “existence of materialists and of a materialist theory of knowledge”8. Lenin just had not understood Mach - or, as is more likely, deliberately misrepresented what he said, mistakenly believing Mach’s work was “anti-materialist”.
Few individuals had more impact on 20th century science than Mach - those who acknowledged indebtedness to him included not only Einstein, but Bohr, Heisenberg and William James. Contrary to what Lenin wrote, neither Mach’s groundwork (important aspects with which Einstein and Popper strongly opposed) nor the Einsteinian developments that followed posed any threat to a materialist view of science.
Inferential statistics
A key founder of the ‘methodology’ for testing scientific theory was Karl Pearson (1857-1936). Christened ‘Carl’, the spelling of his first name was accidentally changed to ‘Karl’ when he accepted a post at Heidelberg University - a spelling he chose not to correct (legend has this as being due to his having met Karl Marx and becoming a committed ‘Marxist’. The rumour is unlikely to be true, but Pearson was indeed a convinced Marxist!) Pearson was the founder of mathematical or inferential statistics; today, every ‘science undergraduate’ encounters Pearson’s ‘chi-square’ and ‘correlation coefficient’!
Pearson’s The prostitution of science (1887) argues (as indeed did Einstein a century later) that we (instinctively) seek ‘order’ in natural phenomena - “our knowledge of invariability is only the result of experience and is based therefore upon probability” and “our knowledge of order is proportional to our knowledge of its enormous probability”.9 In the following century, statistical theory was developed essentially to enable scientific study to continue. To an enormous extent, ‘doing science’ today is largely ‘doing statistics’ (as Einstein often remarked).
This is well illustrated in the Penguin Dictionary of science, where we find the ‘atom’ defined thus: “In the more modern wave mechanics the electrons are regarded as having a dual wave particle existence, which is expressed mathematically by a wave function. The precise position of the electron in the Bohr model of the atom is therefore replaced in the wave mechanical model by a probability that a particular planetary electron, visualised as a particle, may be found at a particular point in the path of a wave. Thus, in this model the atom is visualised as a central nucleus surrounded by a distribution of probabilities that individual electrons will exist at certain points at certain instants of time”.10
Knowledge theories
Every individual has a number of theories relating to the world. Many are ‘true’ (determined pragmatically, at a basic level), many are ‘false’; many are ‘useful’, many ‘unhelpful’ for a happy and meaningful life. Those whose theories are ‘religious’ might find them ‘helpful’ for themselves (!), although readers of the Weekly Worker would surely agree with me that, as Jack Conrad illustrates in his overview, for humankind per se, religious theories function to strengthen the power and control of ruling classes. Likewise, alternative theories, theories of ‘class action’ and ‘revolutionary social actions’ could engender a world free from alienation and exploitation.
These are not the main questions addressed by Karl Popper - he simply distinguishes between ‘science’ and ‘non-science’. A theory is ‘scientific’ if it (and conjectures or hypotheses associated with it) can be tested and possibly ‘falsified’. (Newton’s ‘laws of motion’ fall into this category.) A theory is ‘non-scientific’ if it cannot be tested and possibly ‘falsified’. (‘Christ died for our sins’ falls into this category.)
Theories from both categories might be true - that is not the issue. Like it or not, scientific theories are ‘tested’ statistically for probability (concluding almost any research report, a reader finds a statement like ‘p<.05’, which translates as: ‘If the experiment were performed 100 times, the data obtained would occur by chance only five times’). All ‘truths’ are provisional; theories are never absolutely ‘proved’ (except in a probabilistic sense).
Genuine scientists are delighted to find their hypotheses ‘falsified’, for this leads them to seek facts opposing what they believe, to modify and ‘improve’ the theory - rather in the fashion of Charles Darwin: “I had also during many years followed a golden rule - namely, that whenever a published fact, a new observation or thought came across me, which was opposed to my general results, to make a memorandum of it without fail and at once”;11 and again: “I have steadily endeavoured to keep my mind free so as to give up any hypothesis, however much beloved (and I cannot resist forming one on every subject), as soon as facts are shown to be opposed to it. Indeed, I have had no choice but to act in this manner, for with the exception of the Coral Reefs, I cannot remember a single first-formed hypothesis which had not after a time to be given up or greatly modified. This has led me to distrust greatly deductive reasoning in the mixed sciences.”12
So progress (in knowledge) is a process where hypotheses are tested and if not supported there is a recognised need to formulate better hypotheses (or more fundamentally, a ‘better theory’). In principle, I cannot see why this approach to discovering more about the world has to be automatically characterised as ‘reactionary’ and ‘anti-Marxist’.
Karl Popper suggests Marxism is, by definition, untestable. Personally, I am not convinced this is necessarily so. It is certainly not possible to ‘test’ Marx’s statement to Weydemeyer (1852): “ … no credit is due to me for discovering the existence of classes in modern society nor yet the struggle between them. Long before me bourgeois historians had described the historical development of this class struggle ... What I did that was new was to prove: (1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular, historic phases in the development of production; (2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat; (3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society.”13
This is not to say elements of Marxian theory are, in principle, ‘untestable’ - in similar manner as, say, biological and psychological theories are broken down into testable elements. Perhaps Popper himself deals with some of these possible ‘elements’. His overview of Marx, found in the second volume of The open society and its enemies (1945)14, deserves a full essay in its own right, and certainly deserves a reading by all ‘Marxists’!
It castigates the ‘vulgar Marxists’, who Popper tells the reader do indeed ‘vulgarise’ Marx. He explains that, for Marx, “social phenomena must be explained historically”. Ahead of the majority of Marxists at the time of writing, he highlights that “Marx loved freedom, real freedom … yet our freedom must always be limited by the necessities of our metabolism” (p103-04); “the ruling class gains freedom at the cost of the ruled class ... members of the ruling class are bound to oppress and fight the ruled” (p112); “ the capitalist is personified capital” (p114); “‘class-conscious’ (in German) means ‘assured or proud of one’s class’, which is why Marxists apply it almost exclusively to the working class (p115); “the state is the means whereby one class legalises and perpetuates its oppression” (p118); parliament is but a “veiled dictatorship of the bourgeoisie” (p122); hence “the impotence of politics” (p133); the coming social revolution is “not necessarily violent; however, resistance of oppressors made it more likely” (p149); and a lengthy supportive quotation from Engels (p159).
In his chapter ‘An evaluation of the prophecy’, Popper points to the obvious differences between what Marx had predicted and what was achieved by the (Stalinist) regime: “… for he (Marx) strongly believed that the impending development would diminish the influence, political as well as economic, of the state, while intervention has increased it everywhere.” This is a very inadequate summary of some of the main aspects covered by the author, but hopefully it shows the book is no scurrilous venture, “intellectually dishonest and anti-Marxist”, as Conrad suggests.
The ideas of Marx are an essential grounding for today’s ‘understanding’ of human society, but to perceive human social development as acting in accordance with certain basic ‘laws’ after the style of the Newtonian theories of motion, elaborated more than three centuries ago, would be to emulate Newton in his almost fanatical acceptance that the laws he ‘discovered’ were the mystical secrets of the Almighty, waiting to be wrung from nature.
In all sciences, experimentation is the norm, the use of inferential statistics the accepted method of handling the data obtained. Clearly there are differences between experimentation in physics, chemistry, biology, psychology and the less laboratory-based, ‘natural’ studies set up in the social sciences. Many readers might be indifferent to Popper’s differentiation (and definition) of ‘science’ and ‘non science’, but it is important we realise that the underlying theory behind every ‘experiment’ is a concrete example of Popper’s philosophy. The technical words used may vary; but usually we cast an hypothesis (maybe indirectly) and in contrast a ‘null hypothesis’ - it is the hypothesis that one particular variable does not cause another; a hypothesis we hope to ‘nullify’. In theory, at least, a ‘disappointing’ outcome forces a ‘rewrite’ of the ‘experimental hypothesis’/‘theory’ (no doubt some Marxists will choose to introduce dialectical terminology here!).
It would be a pity if Marxists continued to ignore and/or misrepresent Popper. Instead if they wish to justify the long-standing claim that ‘Marxism is a science’ they must either clearly define what they mean by ‘science’ or, better still, formulate hypotheses that are ‘testable’ l
Notes
1. M Cornforth The open philosophy and the open society London 1968.
2. KR Popper Objective knowledge: an evolutionary approach Oxford 1972, p258.
3. KR Popper The logic of scientific discovery Oxford 1972.
4. KR Popper, JC Eccles The self and its brain New York 1977, pp496-97.
5. KR Popper Objective knowledge: an evolutionary approach Oxford 1972, p266.
6. www.stephenjaygould.org/ctrl/popper_falsification.html.
7. A Einstein Ideas and opinions New York 1954, p301.
8. VI Lenin Materialism and empirio-criticism Moscow 1952, p181.
9. K Pearson The ethic of freethought London 1901, p47.
10. Penguin dictionary of science London 1988.
11. M Eastman Marxism: is it science? London 1941, p173.
12. Autobiography of Charles Darwin Thinkers Library, No7, London 1931 p76.
13. Correspondence of Marx and Engels London 1936 p181.
14. KR Popper The open society and its enemies Vol 2, London 1945. See p100 onwards.