WeeklyWorker

22.05.2014

Regime still on the ropes

Deadlock over nuclear negotiations has exacerbated tensions both inside and outside Iran, notes Yassamine Mather

After months of optimism Iran’s negotiations with the P5+1 powers (the five permanent members of the UN security council plus Germany), the stalemate at the latest round of talks held last week in Vienna has given way to a growing mood of pessimism. There are, though, serious implications if the negotiations over limiting Iran’s nuclear programme continue to stall.

In his speech to the Hands Off the People of Iran day school in January, Mike Macnair reminded us of the negotiations and confrontations that preceded the Iraq war of 2003. He warned: “We should remember in this context that the long period of sanctions against Iraq, combined with episodic military attacks, in the period 1991-2002 was punctuated by negotiations, by partial relaxations of sanctions, by ‘a deal is possible’ type periods - and still it ended in war.”1 Quite clearly, both the celebrations of an imminent final agreement by the supporters of the ‘reformist’ movement in Iran, and the reactionary panic of Republicans in the US Congress and Senate, Israel and exiled Iranian groups associated with various regime change funds, were premature.

The May 14-16 Vienna meeting was supposed to start the drafting process for a final agreement and the failure saw immediate consequences. Shares on the Tehran stock exchange tumbled and, although Iranian officials claim that missing the July deadline is not a “tragedy”, failing to reach a deal some time this summer will be.

There is no doubt in Washington and other western capitals that the international political situation has changed considerably since November 2013. If Iran was then one of the last political issues dividing the USA and Russia, the crisis in Ukraine has changed all that.

The Obama administration is now under a lot of pressure. A number of factors - including criticism of its inability to stop Russian intervention in Crimea and the potential fallout from Congress investigations into the attack by Islamic militants on the American diplomatic mission in Libya, where the US ambassador was killed - have forced Obama to adopt a tougher stance on foreign affairs issues, and this includes the US position regarding a long-term deal with Iran. Republicans, and some Democrats, are once again raising objections to negotiations. The pro-sanctions lobby claims that, had it not been for Washington’s weakness both in terms of ignoring the ‘red line’ it set on Syria’s use of chemical weapons and in terms of a softer approach to Iran’s Islamic Republic, Russia would not have had the courage to intervene in Crimea.

Ukraine has also had repercussions for Russia-Iran relations. Since 2007, the US has managed to obtain the support of Russia and China for its plans to isolate Iran over its nuclear programme. UN resolutions and sanctions imposed since then were agreed by all P5+1 countries. But now that western countries are imposing sanctions against Russia, president Vladimir Putin is already warning that Russia might not agree to any further sanctions. It might even break ranks over existing ones. Such a development would weaken the current US position of wanting to impose on Iran conditions that are clearly far more stringent than those stipulated in the international non-proliferation treaty. Iran, on the other hand, is trying to benefit from possible sanctions against Russia by proposing to export natural gas to European countries seeking to diversify their energy sources.

Repercussions

The failure of this round of negotiations has serious repercussions for the Rowhani government, as it confronts internal critics as well as the P5+1 negotiators. A tweet by Iran’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif, summed up the issues facing Iran: “Illusions need to go.” One assumes he was talking about expectations, on the one side (US Republicans, etc), that Iran will give up the bulk of its nuclear and missile development programme in exchange for little more than a reduction in sanctions and, on the other (those around supreme leader Ali Khamenei), that Iran will be able to keep its nuclear and missile programmes and still get all sanctions lifted.

By May 18 Zarif was sounding more worried in his tweets: “Opportunity shouldn’t be missed again, like in 2005.” This was a reference to the 2005 proposals for Iran to halt its pre-weapon grade nuclear enrichment programme. At that time it was the US that rejected any compromise. It was not prepared to accept any level of uranium enrichment. However, ayatollah Khamenei has been quite clear about his ‘red lines’. Iran has complied with existing limitations, stopping enrichment at 20% and destroying stockpiles of more highly enriched uranium. But the supreme leader insists the country should be allowed to continue enrichment up to 5%. Following the surrender of November 2013, accepting further limitations would be a humiliation and it is unlikely that Rowhani and his ministers could deliver anyway.

So the confrontation is about how many centrifuges Iran will be allowed to maintain, the quality of these centrifuges and the continuing saga of the Arak plutonium reactor. The west accuses Iran of looking for an alternative path to develop nuclear weapons using heavy-water, high-powered, plutonium reactors. Iran is adamant the Arak programme has nothing to do with developing nuclear weapons, which are apparently haram (forbidden) in Shia Islam. The main question is, are we witnessing a hardening of the US position in the light of events unfolding in Ukraine and the pressure by Republicans, as well as American Israel Public Affairs Committee supporters in Congress and the Senate?

Iranian groups, both left and right, that favour western-sponsored regime change are amongst the cheerleaders of this tendency,2 trying to prove that Rowhani is as bad as former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Which he no doubt is, but on international issues Iran’s current position remains one of capitulation. In this the supreme leader and the current government are united for the time being, both seeking an end to sanctions for the sake of the economy - and indeed their own personal, political and collective wealth.

However, the principal reasons why the US and its allies are still interested in a deal with Iran remain intact. They have little to do with Rowhani’s election or Zarif’s diplomatic initiatives.

1. After the ‘Arab spring’ US strategists are no longer paranoid about Iran’s Islamic revolution. These events showed that even if an Islamist group comes to power in an Arab country, as they did in Egypt, there will be no repeat of February 79, when ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini took control in Iran. The Muslim Brotherhood, Sunni Jihadists in Libya and Sunni moderates in Tunisia will not become allies of Iran’s Shia Islamic Republic.

2. Even if political Islam came to power in another Middle Eastern country, it would be Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf countries who would control the purse strings and dictate how events unfolded, not Iran. For the US and western Europe the conclusion is simple: Iran’s Islamic revolution will not spread. Therefore, unlike the social-imperialists of the Alliance for Workers’ Liberty stripe, the US is no longer paranoid about political Islam.

3. The violence inflicted by Islamic Jihadists in Syria, Libya and Iraq has made western public opinion wary of Saudi Arabia, which finances these ‘holy warriors’. The US administration is concerned that its main ally in the Arab world cannot control its Jihadist creatures, so it upholds its twin-track policy of better relations with Iran while maintaining support for Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf countries.

Critics point out that the US administration spends huge amounts on Middle Eastern NGOs in order to ‘promote civil society’ and weaken political Islam, yet it never seems to put pressure on the Sunni governments that finance the extremist Islamists. I would argue that both the sponsorship of Islamic fundamentalism and continued US financial and political support for NGOs are part and parcel of a strategy of maintaining a state of conflict in the region. How else could a superpower divert attention from the atrocities of Israel, its principal protégé in the region and a country that, according to none other than the US secretary of state John Kerry, is moving towards “apartheid”.

Worried

As far as negotiations go, those inside Iran who are against rapprochement with the US have began to manoeuvre. In early May opponents of the interim deal held a rally in the compound of the former US embassy in Tehran under the banner, “We’re worried”. The original venue had been a sports stadium, but this was changed at the last moment, as the organisers realised they would not get sufficient numbers. The smaller than expected turnout was a clear sign that the supreme leader did not back this particular initiative. The meeting was called by a number of conservative factions to condemn what they call a “bad deal.” Fereydoon Abbasi, the former head of Iran’s atomic energy organisation, did not mince his words when referring to the foreign minister: “I do not think smiling is right for someone who has weakened our national interests.”

The ‘reformist’ newspapers, Ghanoon and Arman, went to town about the rally, calling it weak and an embarrassment for the organisers. Supporters of former ‘reformist’ presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Moussavi, who is currently under house arrest, created a Facebook page that used the same slogan as the conservatives: “We’re worried for: the future of Iran and the people; the freedom of those in prison; and the health of Mir-Hossein Moussavi ...”

This was a serious setback for the opponents of the interim deal. However, it showed the strength of feeling amongst conservative sections of the regime - failure to reach an agreement by July will inevitably increase their strength. Apart from anything else, the diverse conservative factions who united under the “We’re worried” slogan include some beneficiaries of the vast profits made during the high point of sanctions. As part of the system they are in a unique position to benefit from black market opportunities. Many suspect that their main worry about loss of the income gained from having a monopoly over imported goods associated with sanctions and selling them at astronomically inflated prices.

Despite the relaxation of some sanctions, Iran’s economy remains in a terrible state. The currency is still weak and at the mercy of the P5+1 negotiations. According to government supporters, some wealthy businessmen opposed to Rowhani’s reforms are deliberately dumping rials, sending a warning that he should not go too far.

The direction of the new government is very clear. It is seeking better relations with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and it has the backing of most sections of Iranian capital. Contrary to the illusions of some on the left, the ‘bazaaris’ of the 1970s and 1980s are as much in favour of further integration with world capital as the big industrialists. So the struggle in Iran is no longer about obscurantist capital versus modern capital. It is a conflict over means: a continuation of sanctions benefits some capitalists, while harming others. Divisions within the regime and amongst various factions of the Revolutionary Guards reflect these interests. Both sides, however, are united in their support for neoliberal economic institutions and, of course, both are for the continued exploitation of the Iranian working class.

A question posed on the left concerns whether the continuation of the sanctions, hyperinflation, mass unemployment and the kind of despair that characterised the latter years of the Ahmadinejad presidency make for more favourable conditions for class struggle. My answer is clear: immiseration and poverty hold back the ability of workers to fight back. We demand improvements not only because that is what workers need, but because they will enable workers to organise more effectively l

yassamine.mather@weeklyworker.org.uk

Notes

1. ‘Changed and unchanged’ Weekly Worker January 30.

2. These supporters of further sanctions against Iran include a plethora of left and right opposition groups, ranging from royalists to those on the left whose survival in exile depends on funds associated with regime change from above. These diehard advocates of western ‘humanitarian intervention’ have already seen a dip in contributions from North American and European governments for their women’s organisations, satellite TV channels and even ‘workers’ solidarity fronts’ and, of course, any improvement in Iran’s relations with the west will directly impact on their existence. Divorced from the realities of a complicated situation inside Iran, indoctrinated by capitalist propaganda, full of illusions about the western legal system and ‘human rights’, our former Marxists are so submerged in their own little campaigns that they fail to see the wood for the trees.